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FOREWORD
The phenomenon of Iraq’s Shia warlords and the
militias they lead has significant implications for the
conduct of the war against Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), including for U.S. policy interests and for
U.S. Landpower forces deployed in-country.
In this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar analyzes the
rapid resurgence of the Shia militias and the warlords
thanks to a mass popular mobilization in response
to the severe ISIS threat to the country in 2014. The
militias have played a key role in helping to stabilize
the situation on the ground, while the Iraqi Army has
been rebuilding with the help of the international Coalition. At the same time, the warlords have become
significant political players who have an impact on issues of interest to the United States, such as sectarian
reconciliation and the formation of a National Guard
in Sunni areas, which have implications for the future
of Iraq’s security and stability.
Dr. Cigar focuses on the interests, policies, operations, and capabilities of the warlords and the militias
they command, and highlights that they are embedded in operations with the Iraqi Army and national
police. Knowing as much as possible about these militias takes on added importance, given the significant
U.S. military contribution to the fight against ISIS in
the form of air support, training, planning assistance,
intelligence sharing, and logistics—including a key
landpower element—operating with the presence of
the Shia militias on the same battlefield. The militias
are significant, in particular, for force protection and
operational security issues in relation to the deployed
U.S. forces.
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A key conclusion of this monograph is that, because of the continuing need for their participation in
the fight against ISIS as the Iraqi Army is rebuilt, and
the warlords’ growing political power as well as the
popularity they have gained from their victories, the
warlords and the militias are likely to remain a significant factor for the foreseeable future. In addition,
the ascendancy of the Shia warlords and militias are
likely to provide Iran with greater access and influence in Iraq. At the operational level, the monograph
points to the need for deconfliction to avoid friendlyfire incidents that could escalate, given the militias’
traditional hostility and suspicion of U.S. motives, as
well as continuing attention to operational security
and force protection.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of its continuing effort
to inform discussions on dealing with the ongoing
ISIS threat and security issues in Iraq. This analysis
should be useful to help strategic leaders, planners,
intelligence professionals, and commanders to better understand the challenges of the contemporary
strategic landscape in the Middle East and to craft
effective responses.
			
			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
As America’s de facto co-belligerents who often
share the same battlespace in the fight against Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the presence and activity
of Iraq’s Shia warlords and their militias have an impact on U.S. interests and policies at both the strategic
and operational levels. The practical objective of this
monograph is to provide a better understanding of the
Shia militia phenomenon and to highlight the factors
with which U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army planners and commanders will have to deal with respect
to operations in Iraq.
The appearance and rapid advance in 2014 of ISIS,
or the Islamic State as it calls itself, and the security
crisis that resulted in Iraq also engendered a mushrooming in the size and role of the Shia militias in Iraq
and has resulted in the unprecedented importance
and status of the warlords who lead them. With the reenergizing of the pre-existing militias and the creation
of new ones as part of a mass mobilization, this force
has played a significant role in most of the campaigns,
helping to stem and then turn the ISIS tide, thanks to
its religious commitment, Iranian support, and previous experience gained by some fighters in Syria.
The militias are embedded in mainstream society,
and the warlords who lead them are also political and
often religious leaders and have emerged as powerbrokers in the country’s political system in their own
right. Not only have the militias had an impact on the
battlefield, but the warlords have also shaped policies
on such issues as the formation of a National Guard in
the Sunni areas, whether to target ISIS in urban areas,
whether to rehabilitate the Baathists, and whether to
establish détente with the Gulf States; they have also
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hindered reconciliation with the Sunni community,
which is needed in order to weaken ISIS’s appeal in
that community.
As the U.S. Landpower footprint increases, planners and commanders must remain sensitive to the integrated position the warlords and the militias have in
Iraq’s security system and the fact that the militias are
embedded in military operations with the Army and
police. As such, their presence and influence must be
considered in U.S. decisionmaking, and the appropriate conditions and limits on operational cooperation,
intelligence sharing, and logistic support to the Iraqi
forces must be determined. In particular, the warlords have often displayed hostility to U.S. interests
and could represent a potential force protection concern to any U.S. ground presence. Given the militias’
links with Iran, Iranian hostility to U.S. policies or a
degradation in U.S.-Iranian relations could increase
the risk to deployed personnel. Iraqis perceive a continuing need for the militias in the effort against ISIS
for some time to come, given the requirement to rebuild the Army after its earlier poor showing against
ISIS and its history of corruption, politicization, and
neglect. Combined with this need, the recent rise in
the warlords’ popularity and legitimacy is likely to
ensure an ongoing role for them in Iraq’s security and
political life for the foreseeable future.
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IRAQ’S SHIA WARLORDS AND
THEIR MILITIAS:
POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES
AND OPTIONS
INTRODUCTION
The appearance and rapid advance of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or the Islamic State, as it
calls itself, in 2014 and the security crisis that resulted
in Iraq also engendered a mushrooming in the size
and role of the Shia militias in Iraq and has resulted
in the unprecedented importance and status of the
warlords who lead them. As such, these militias have
become a significant part of the country’s security and
political landscape that one cannot ignore, and they
are likely to remain a factor to contend with for some
time to come. Moreover, if not allies, the Shia militias
have become for Washington at least co-belligerents
in what one can justly term the ISIS War.
Unavoidably, in Iraq’s dynamic political and security situation, details about the militias will evolve
rapidly, and, at most, one can only portray a snapshot
of the situation. However, what one can do is identify
and analyze the factors and trends as of this writing—
February 2015—that one can expect to persist and to
draw conclusions on that basis. Ultimately, the practical objective of this monograph is to provide a better
understanding of the Shia militia phenomenon and
highlight the factors with which U.S. policymakers
and U.S. Army planners and commanders will have
to deal. Given the already significant U.S. ground
presence in Iraq, Americans will have to interact with
the Shia militias both strategically at the political level
and operationally on the battlefield. As such, it is im-
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portant to understand the militias’ identity, objectives,
strategic and operational impact, and the implications
for U.S. Landpower forces and political decisionmakers involved in Iraqi affairs.
What to call these Shia military formations is, in itself, a controversial issue in Iraq. The militias and their
supporters label themselves generically as “Al-Hashd
Al-Shabi” (the Popular Mobilization or Levée en Masse),
“the Islamic Resistance” (al-muqawama al-islamiya),
“the Volunteers” (al-mutatawwiun), or the mujahidin.
Detractors refer to them as “militias” (milishiyat),
which, in Iraq, has a pejorative connotation equivalent
to “gangs.” Here the general term, “militias,” will be
used in the English-language sense as a descriptive of
such organizations without any negative implication,
equivalent to the generic “Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” or just
“Al-Hashd” in the Iraqi texts.
The Militias’ Early Years.
Shia militias have been a political-military factor in
Iraq ever since the overthrow of the Saddam regime in
2003 and were often at odds with the U.S. presence in
the country, many times resulting in clashes with the
U.S. armed forces, as well as with the Sunni community and the local government. Although the U.S.-led
Coalition had managed to control such militias, often
after hard-fought campaigns in which the militias
many times took heavy casualties, the latter continued
to exist, even if only in a reduced form.
With a diminishing of the jihadist Sunni threat after 2008 and the imminent departure of U.S. forces,
militia force structures were reduced. During the
succeeding “quiet years,” some militias, such as the
Mahdi Army (Jaysh Al-Mahdi) led by Muqtada Al-
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Sadr, reverted largely to a reserve status, while in the
case of the Badr militia, many of its personnel were
integrated into the country’s security forces. Other militias continued to operate more actively, as was true
of the Units of the Righteous People (Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq), the latter, with the tacit blessing of and often
in close coordination with the security forces in Sunni
areas where they were accused of a pattern of crimes
against civilians, contributing a significant grievance against Al-Maliki’s Shia-majority government
and armed forces and feeding Sunni resistance and a
willingness to cooperate with ISIS.1 Some of the Iraqi
militias’ cadres were also receiving further training in
Iran or Lebanon during this operational lull. Some of
the militias, such as Badr and Ahl Al-Haqq, continued
to operate in Al-Anbar province at Prime Minister AlMaliki’s request as part of the campaign against Sunni
dissidents.2
The Syrian Interlude.
After the outbreak of the Arab Spring in neighboring Syria in 2011 and the rise of Al-Qaida activity
there, many of the Iraqi militias revived their activity
as they deployed personnel to fight on behalf of the
Asad regime. Rather than being motivated by any devotion to the secular Baathist Asad regime, it was the
possibility of victory by Sunni Islamist forces that was
seen as a threat to Shia shrines in Syria and to Shia
interests in general that provided the impetus. It was
reportedly the commander of the Quds Division, the
unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
responsible for foreign operations, Major General Qasim Sulaymani, who had ordered the Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq and other Iraqi militia elements loyal to Iran to
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deploy to Syria. According to the media, these units
were armed and trained in Iraq and Iran under Quds
supervision, and subsequently crossed Iraq to Syria,
with the Iranian embassy in Baghdad coordinating the
effort. Almost 5,000 fighters were said to have gone to
Syria, with most of the existing militias represented.3
Iraqi Shia clerics encouraged such volunteers, and the
Iraqi government under Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki tacitly endorsed and supported such deployments,
while government officials attended public memorial
services for those who fell in Syria.4 Transit was no
doubt facilitated by the fact that Hadi Al-Amiri, head
of the Badr Force militia and a long-time Iranian ally,
at the time was Iraq’s Minister of Transportation.5
The intensity of the combat operations against the
Al-Qaida-backed Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS in Syria is
suggested by the fact that one militia, Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq, acknowledged having lost 300 fighters in just
one engagement extending over several days in the
Damascus area.6 Iraqi militia leaders often established
their credibility in the Syrian theater, as was the case
with Falih Al-Khazali, then a leader in the Iraqi Hizb
Allah (who subsequently broke away to establish the
Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ militia as a separate organization), who lost an eye in the fighting in Syria.
Responding to the ISIS War: The Militias
Are Re-energized.
The current resurgence of the militias can be traced
to the ascent in 2013-14 of the local Al-Qaida branch —
originally The Islamic State in Iraq, later renamed The
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State
in the Levant (ISIL), and renamed once again as the Islamic State in June 2014 when it broke with Al-Qaida.

4

Thanks to the experience and arms gained from fighting against the Asad regime in Syria and the political
alliances it contracted with dissident Sunni elements
(tribes, Saddam-era Baathists, military officers, and
non-Al-Qaida jihadists) seething against what they
termed a repressive Shia-dominated Baghdad government, ISIS was able to make rapid territorial advances
in Iraq in 2014, which was facilitated by the collapse
of Iraq’s security forces. This expansion was accompanied by massacres and expulsions of Shia military personnel and civilians, as well as the destruction of Shia
shrines and religious institutions in the areas that ISIS
seized, creating a national crisis that marked a turning point in both the country’s history and in the fortunes of the militias. In effect, the country’s majority
Shia community, which was at greatest risk from ISIS,
saw it had few, if any, other options for its survival in
the face of a disintegrating Iraqi Army patently unable to stop ISIS. Likewise, the Iraqi government, then
still led by Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, could find
no other immediate expedient to try to stem the ISIS
onslaught than the existing Shia militias. When two
combat-hardened militia units returned from Syria to
Iraq in June 2014, the beleaguered government immediately deployed them to the front lines.7
Significantly, it was the country’s most senior
Shia religious figure, Ali Al-Sistani, known as the Authority (Al-Marja, or his office as Al-Marjaiya), who
provided the mechanism for an enormous and rapid
expansion of the militias. Reacting to the vehemently
anti-Shia acts by ISIS in the recently conquered areas
and its stated intent to march to the Shia holy cities
of Karbala and Najaf, on June 13, 2014, Al-Sistani
promulgated a fatwa, or religious opinion, declaring
a jihad incumbent on the community as a whole (ji-
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had kifa’i). This call triggered a levée en masse within
the Shia community, what came to be known as
Al-Hashd Al-Shabi.
DEVELOPING THE MILITIAS
Thanks to the flood of new recruits generated by
Al-Sistani’s call-up, existing militias were vastly increased, while new militia units were also formed.
Raising, financing, and training the new recruits
marked a cooperative effort among the existing militias, the Iraqi government, the Shia religious establishment, and the Shia tribes. For example, in the Basra
area, recruits—often by tribal contingent—reported to
the police stations, while it was the Basra local government that provided money to outfit the volunteers.
Mobilization.
At first, there was no real mechanism in place to
process the volunteers. Ten times more volunteers
came forward than the government had anticipated
or wanted. Of the million-plus who stepped forward,
Prime Minister Al-Ibadi (sometimes spelled Al-Abadi), who replaced Al-Maliki after the latter’s ouster in
September 2014, later confirmed that “Only a small
number of them were used, since it was not possible
to use all of them.”8 Most initial volunteers probably
were deemed unfit for duty, have ended up in home
guard duties, or may well have returned home after
the initial outburst of zeal. Actual numbers on the
ground are hard to determine. According to one local official, there were over 17,000 volunteers committed on various fronts by September 2014, while Hay’at
Al-Hashd Al-Shabi reported 60,000 in the field in late-
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2014.9 A hostile senior Iraqi political figure reported
in January 2015 that the militias had 250,000 men in
its force structure (perhaps considering active and reserve/home guard personnel), with plans to double
that force structure within 6 months.10 A Badr commander, for his part, claimed by the end of 2014 that
there were 100,000 militia fighters.11 Tallies may depend on how one counts committed and supporting
forces, including militia reservists, home guards, and
part-time personnel. Determining the total strength is
even more difficult, with few militias providing end
strength figures, such as the Saraya Ashura’, which
claimed to have 50,000 personnel, and the Al-Abbas
Division that claimed 5,000 fighters, with at least
3,000 more in its reserve component.12 What is significant is the impact that the infusion of so many new
volunteers was to have on the battlefield.
In particular, volunteers who joined new units—
such as the Abbas Division sponsored by the central Shia religious shrine, Al-Ataba Al-Husayniya, in
Karbala—often came from specific areas, in the latter
case, from Karbala and the Basra area.13 Shia tribes
served as significant manpower pools and provided
a recruitment mechanism, as in Babil province, where
tribes set up volunteer recruitment centers, with entire tribal contingents volunteering and tribal shaykhs
sometimes leading the volunteers.14 For example, in
Al-Muthanna province, the tribes had supplied some
1,200 volunteers initially and sent more subsequently.15 The Muntafida tribes, for their part, contributed
5,000 volunteers.16 The raising and deployment of militia units has been a continuing process, and in late
October 2014, one militia warlord, Ammar Al-Hakim,
called for the formation of additional militia units to
guard the shrines in Karbala and Najaf.17 In January
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2015, Dhi Qar province sent 750 fighters as reinforcements to the militias operating in Diyala.18 As mixed
areas were retaken from ISIS, more local Shia were
said to have joined the militias, as in Salah Al-Din
province, where hundreds were reported to have volunteered, according to an Iraqi government minister,
and 3,000 after the town of Al-Muqdadiya in Diyala
was retaken.19 In early-2015, in fact, the militias organized by the senior Shia religious establishment, the
Ataba, announced the opening of new recruitment
centers throughout the country.20
Training and Readiness.
Since 2014, the militias have developed as a threetiered force. First, there was the experienced nucleus,
which had existed before the call-up; second, there
were the recent volunteers who lacked any real training or combat experience; and, third, there was a reserve component, part of which also served as a local
home guard. As one could expect, pre-existing militias, thanks to their experienced cadres and personnel
and standing organizational structure, were able to
take greatest advantage of the mobilization and have
been the most prominent on the battlefield ever since.
According to Hadi Al-Amiri (as commander of
Badr), the initial influx of volunteers brought in many
with no training, who could not be sent immediately
to the front. The Badr Force dealt with the influx of
volunteers by sorting them by level of experience and
provided training to the neophytes.21 As Al-Amiri
reports, Iranian teams participated in their training,
and he claims the Iranians trained 60 percent of the
volunteers.22
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At times, the training was rudimentary, such as
the 2-week course for a newly raised unit, Al-Hakim’s
Fawj Al-Imam Al-Baqir, itself part of the larger Saraya
Ashura’ unit, composed mostly of tribesmen and refugees.23 The initial training for the new volunteers in
Karbala’, on the other hand, took place at the provincial Police Academy.24 Likewise, a unit that the Shia
charitable foundation (Waqf) raised was trained at the
Najaf provincial Police Academy.25 The Saraya Ashura’
militia was trained and armed by the national police.26 At times, individual militias provided training
for their own volunteers, as in the case of the Saraya
Al-Salam, although in some cases, the latter provided
recruits with only a single day of training.27 The Badr
militia, with its advantage of combat experience, also
provided cadres for other newly formed militia units,
which contributed a particular focus on military operations in urban terrain (MOUT).28 In general, new
fighters were probably expected to learn on the job,
operating alongside more experienced veterans. More
recently, at least some volunteers have gone through
longer training courses, such as the 3,200 graduates of
a 3-months course they completed in January 2015.29
As suggested already, most personnel may be serving as home guards. A militia unit in its entirety could
have the permanent role of a home guard, or an individual committed militia could have its own reserve
component, as in Najaf, where some 3,000 fighters
were mobilized for the specific mission of defending
the city, or for temporary guard duty, as when the Abbas Division called up 3,000 of its reserves to provide
security for the upcoming Ashura religious festival in
Karbala.30 Some reservists were expected to be able to
respond quickly, as was the case when Muqtada AlSadr ordered the Saraya Al-Salam reserves in Al-Muth-
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anna province to be ready with a 48-hour notice.31
Indicative of the gravity of the ISIS threat in the early
period, the Supreme Islamic Council had even provided arms handling training to women volunteers
in Najaf.32 In January 2015, plans were also reported
for a women’s contingent to support the militias with
food preparation and medical care for the upcoming
operation to liberate Mosul.33
Equipping and Maintaining the Militias.
Often, the financial and other support the government promised has fallen short of the militias’ expectations, creating recurring problems. The central government has provided the bulk of the militias’ funding
since the call-up of 2014, and had already spent $1
billion on the militias by late-2014, although when
the Finance Minister (a Kurd) revealed the expense,
it aroused a storm of protest from militia supporters,
who accused him of seeking to sabotage the project
with his revelations.34 However, the actual payment
of salaries and benefits to the intended beneficiaries
has proven to be a major problem, with fighters often
complaining of not receiving any pay for months at a
time, if at all.
Grumbling soon also arose about shortages of food,
drinking water, equipment, and ammunition.35 As one
Army source acknowledged, militias often were said
to have a more reliable logistics system than did the
Army, which often neglected to provide even food
to the militias.36 To be sure, even the Army often suffers from such negligence, as in one typical case when
the Army, as well as the militias, was receiving food
unfit for human consumption as a result of government corruption dating from Al-Maliki’s time, and the
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Army itself was often buying food from the private
sector.37 The established militias already had equipment, at least for their core members and, aside from
personal arms, their arsenals included crew-served
weapons, ranging to heavy machine guns, mortars,
and rocket launchers, with four-wheel-drive vehicles
as the preferred mode of transport. Thanks to subsequent acquisitions through government transfers and
capture from ISIS, their arsenals now include artillery,
self-propelled air defense guns, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HUMVEES), and other armor, including even tanks. New militias complained
of the limited supply of arms and munitions that the
government provided, obliging some fighters to buy
their own weapons on the open market.38 Eventually,
some militia units were able to seize arms from ISIS, in
some cases, arms of U.S. origin that ISIS had originally
seized from the Army and paraded that fact, no doubt
embarrassing the latter.39
In addition, operations with the Army often also
gave rise to militia discontent. Some volunteers were
said to have returned home after seeing the unprofessional Iraqi Army with which they were expected
to operate, including exercising “poorly thought-out
plans.”40 The militias also blamed the Army with providing shoddy medical support and poor covering
fire, while accusing Sunni officers of hedging their
bets with ISIS.41
This lack of support has often resulted in degraded
morale and protests by individual fighters. Already in
July 2014, hundreds of volunteers blocked the main
road between two provinces and pelted the local
Member of Parliament’s convoy with rocks in protest
for not receiving any pay, while other angry volunteers refused to go into battle. Demonstrations on a
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large scale over the same issue were repeated in Diyala province in September 2014.42 Some volunteers returned home, even abandoning positions on the front
lines, for that reason.43 Others, such as 200 personnel
from one militia unit, continued to drain away over
time, citing the lack of pay and family benefits.44 Moreover, some fighters complained that certain categories
in the militias, such as individuals who are simultaneously government employees or politicians’ security
guards or those who belong to the warlords’ political
parties, were more likely to get paid than were ordinary volunteers.45 The hardship caused by sporadic
or no pay was heightened by the fact that members
from poor families, many of whose youth had been
unemployed and in need of salaries, constituted the
majority of the new volunteers, as was argued by
a delegation from Babil province to the Baghdad
government.46
The government repeatedly recognized its responsibility to pay the militia fighters, as when it reaffirmed publicly in November 2014 its commitment
to grant the families of militiamen killed in action
the same benefits as military personnel. Prime Minister Al-Ibadi reportedly had to intervene personally
with the bureaucracy to begin to get arrears paid.47
In part, embezzlement by senior officials—especially
during the Al-Maliki era—within the agency tasked
with supporting the militias was to blame for the
problems, with funds diverted for private purposes.48
According to some Members of Parliament, political
favoritism also plays a role, with some militia units
receiving their full pay while others do not, depending on the individual warlord’s clout.49 Even the commander of the Iraqi Hizb Allah militia complained
that salaries and benefits were paid erratically and
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were influenced by how much political clout a militia
could exert.50 The country’s chronic bureaucratic mismanagement no doubt is also to blame for shortfalls
in support.
The militias’ backers in political and religious
circles have often had to resort to lobbying on the
militias’ behalf. For example, the Shia religious establishment—including at the highest levels—repeatedly
has exerted pressure on the government to support
the volunteers with pay, food, weapons, and equipment, which has also been the case with local governments and other prominent religious leaders.51 Local
governments, the parent militia organizations, and
Shia foundations frequently have filled the shortfall
in support given to the fighters for those militias they
sponsored or who came from their areas. For example,
the provincial government of Basra provided 40b Dinars ($3.4 million) to equip the volunteers initially.52
The Shia Waqf, for its part, sent food to both the Army
and the militias in the field at Samarra, and set up field
bakeries and a water-treatment facility for them.53
Organization.
In terms of organization, Prime Minister AlMaliki (who at the time was also Minister of the Interior) placed the old and new militias initially in a
newly-created structure, the Popular Hashd Agency
(Hay’at Al-Hashd Al-Shabi), within the Ministry of the
Interior. However, the agency was faced with managing a coalition of individual jealously autonomist
militias, and its function has been mainly in terms of
funding and benefits, as well as serving as a coordinating mechanism for policy with other government
and security agencies, while the Army was tasked to
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provide logistics and other combat support. As any
bureaucratic organization would, the Hay’a has lobbied frequently for a larger budget on behalf of its
constituency.54 The Director of the Hay’a agency is
Falih Al-Fayyad, who is also the country’s National
Security Adviser (and an Al-Maliki holdover), while
Abu Al-Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the Deputy Director,
is also the number-two man in the Badr organization
and, as of February 2015, another Badr commander,
was made the Hay’a’s spokesman. In the new government led by Prime Minister Al-Ibadi following Al-Maliki’s ouster in September 2014, ultimate responsibility
for this agency went to Muhammad Al-Ghabban, the
new Minister of the Interior, who is a leading figure in
the Badr militia. According to the Minister of the Interior, militias operated under the command and control of his Ministry, but enjoyed delegated authority in
liberated areas.55
Who Are the Militias and the Warlords?
There may be over 50 Shia militias by now, varying
in size, regional affiliation, political orientation, objectives, and importance. At times, there can be intense
rivalry between militias and, in the past, these differences often led to armed clashes between competing
warlords. There are indications that Iran can and at
times has intervened with some militias to deal with
leadership issues which, along with control of turf,
are more significant than ideological ones.56 The following are among the most significant militias—some
old, some new.
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The Militias.
Leadership competition, rather than ideology or
strategy, divides the pro-Iranian militias, over most of
which Iran has influence rather than control. Tehran
may see advantages in this, as it is easier to deal with
several smaller competing dependent militias than
with a single large one.
Militias Allied to Iran.
Quwwat Badr (Badr Force). Originally established
in Iran and used against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War,
it was the military wing of the Supreme Council of
the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (renamed the Supreme
Islamic Council in 2007). The Badr Force, under Hadi
Al-Amiri, broke off from the Council in 2012 following
leadership disputes. It is reported to be close to Iran’s
Quds Division and the latter’s commander, General
Sulaymani.
Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq (Units of the Righteous People).
Its leader, cleric Qays Al-Khazali, broke from Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Jaysh Al-Mahdi militia in 2007 when the
latter stood down, taking 3,000 personnel with him to
form the new militia.
Iraqi Hizb Allah. It is closely linked to Lebanese
Hizb Allah and Iran.
Katai’b Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ (The Greatest Martyr
Battalions). Broke off from Iraqi Hizb Allah in 2013, led
by cleric Shaykh Abu Mustafa Al-Shibani and by Falih
Al-Khazali. It is a close ally of Iran and of the Quds Division, and its website features prominently an image
of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.
Kata’ib Al-Tayyar Al-Risali (The Missionary Movement Battalions). Emerged from Al-Sadr’s Jaysh
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Al-Mahdi, and is led by cleric Shaykh Adnan Al-Shamhani. It is a close ally of Iran and of the Quds Division,
and its website includes an image of Iran’s former
leader, Ayatollah Rouhallah Khomeini.
Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali (The Imam Ali Battalions). Led
by Shibl Al-Zaydi, a former follower of Al-Sadr. AlZaydi has a close personal relationship with General
Sulaymani. It prides itself on special forces operations.
Jaysh Al-Mukhtar (Al-Mukhtar’s Army). Established in 2013 by the former head of the Iraqi Hizb
Allah, cleric Wathiq Al-Battat (killed in action in
December 2014).
Militias Sympathetic or Not Hostile to, but Independent
from, Iran.
Other militias, while willing to cooperate with
Tehran, see themselves as having their own sources of religious legitimacy and emphasize their
independence.
Saraya Al-Salam (The Peace Companies). Its leader,
cleric Hujjat al-islam (a lesser degree of Shia cleric
than an ayatollah) Muqtada Al-Sadr, set up Saraya
Al-Salam in 2014, amalgamating some personnel from
his other militia units and incorporating new recruits,
while also retaining his pre-existing Liwa’ Al-Yawm
Al-Mawud (The Judgment Day Brigade). In February
2015, Al-Sadr “froze” his militias’ operations temporarily, but that may have been a political maneuver on
his part.
Saraya Ashura’ (The Ashura’ Companies). The Supreme Islamic Council, led by cleric Ammar Al-Hakim, formed this militia in 2014, although some cadres
were available from earlier units.
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The two Ataba-s, that is, the two central Shia religious establishments in the holy cities of Karbala
and Najaf, raised their own militia units in 2014, such
as Karbala’s Firqat Al-Abbas Al-Qitaliya (Al-Abbas
Combat Division), which remained directly subordinate to the Shia clerics and which they supported
with logistics.57
Some militia units are composed largely of refugees, such as the Liwa’ Al-Imam Al-Husayn (Imam
Al-Husayn Brigade), composed of the Shia refugees
who had fled the ISIS seizure of Tell Afar in Naynawa
province, a 300-man unit of Christian refugees attached to the Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali, and another unit of
Shabak refugees.58 In early-2015, 1,500 more Shia refugees were being trained in militia camps to join the
6,000 that had preceded them in preparation for the
anticipated campaign to retake Mosul.59
Other militia units have had the character of home
guards for local defense, as was the case of Sariyat
Al-Taff Al-Qitaliya (Al-Taff Combat Company), raised
specifically “to defend the city of Karbala and its holy
shrines.”60 The Shia Waqf also raised a 4,000-man force
whose mission was primarily to protect the holy sites
in Najaf and Kufa and to provide local security for the
annual religious festivals. This unit cooperated operationally with the Badr Force and coordinated with the
Najaf police.61 Yet another militia unit in Karbala was
trained by the Army for a “limited mission,” that of
uprooting “ISIS gangs” and sleeper cells.62
Marginal Militias.
Outside the mainstream, there are also smaller,
more extreme militias—often with a millenarian
worldview—who have not participated in the war
against ISIS. Although limited in size, these militias
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are, nevertheless, a fanatical and unpredictable element, especially at the local level, and are potentially disruptive because of their apocalyptic outlook.
Such militias include the Jund Al-Sama’ (The Army of
Heaven) and the Ansar Al-Mahdi (The Mahdi’s Partisans), both of whom seek to overthrow the existing Shia religious hierarchy and replace it with their
own prophetic movements. Of late, another similar
militia, Jaysh Al-Husayn (Husayn’s Army)—led by
Mahmud Al-Sarkhi, a self-proclaimed grand ayatollah with a millenarian outlook, who has hinted that
he is the expected Mahdi and the rightful leader of
the Shia—has been particularly troublesome, sparking confrontations with the former Al-Maliki government. Al-Sarkhi is vehemently opposed both to Iraq’s
Shia religious establishment and to Iran, as well as to
the United States, and rejected Al-Sistani’s 2014 mobilization call. The Al-Maliki government cracked
down violently on Al-Sarkhi in clashes in July 2014,
but his followers are still on the ground.63 He controls
perhaps 25,000-30,000 followers, and his stronghold is
in Nasiriya.64
The Militia Warlords.
The militias are not marginalized armed gangs.
Rather, the militias and those who control them—
warlords for all intents and purposes—are embedded
in mainstream society. No matter how radical their
positions and actions may seem to outside observers,
there is considerable truth in the claim by the country’s Minister of the Interior that the militias are “an
inseparable element of Iraq’s fabric.”65 Although not
all the militia leaders actually command field operations or have equal power, they are nevertheless treated with deference by Army and police commanders,
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even if a sense of competition and resentment may
also be present. Warlords have regular policy discussions with government officials at the highest levels
on issues that are not limited to just militia affairs.
Moreover, far from being ostracized by senior religious authorities, warlords often meet with and are
welcomed by the latter. Indicative of the established
position the militias have in Iraq’s socio-political system is the fact that any criticism results in figures from
all public sectors leaping to their defense. Opponents
of the militias also have to face the militias’ supporters
in Parliament, who accuse such critics of being “unIraqi” and of “lacking any sense of patriotism.”66
The militia warlords not only have a role in military affairs but have also emerged as powerbrokers
in the country’s political system in their own right,
thanks to an interlocking and reinforcing system of
functions they perform. In a very real sense, the militia warlords are the government, through the political
parties they control and the Members of Parliament
and government officials at both the national and local
levels who are affiliated to those parties or who even
themselves belong to the parties’ military wing; and
this control is, moreover, quite apart from the direct
role in political life that the warlords play personally.
Warlords often can count on networks of loyalists at
the national and local levels who may themselves be
influential political figures, government officials, military and police officers, or clerics. In fact, warlords can
be especially powerful at the local level, where they
may well be dominant, or at least have a significant
presence in a particular city’s administration, police,
religious infrastructure, and economy.
At the national level, for example, members of
Badr include the Ministers of Municipalities, Human
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Rights, Interior, and Communications, as well as the
Deputy Director of the Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Agency.
The Ministers of Transportation, Oil, and Youth on
the other hand, are from the Supreme Islamic Council. The country’s Deputy Prime Minister, Baha’ AlAraji, is a member of Al-Sadr’s party, as are three
Ministers. Officials from militia-linked parties are
also embedded throughout the national government
in other positions of influence. Thus, a Member of
Parliament who belongs to Al-Sadr’s party is also a
member on the Finance Committee in Parliament and
has been influential in shaping the country’s budget.
Shaykh Humam Al-Hammudi, the number-two man
in the Supreme Islamic Council, is also the chairman
of the Foreign Policy Committee in Parliament and is
Parliament’s Deputy Speaker.
Highlighting the interpenetration of institutions,
government officials who belong to political parties that sponsor the militias have themselves often
operated in the field with the militias.
While the case of Al-Amiri may have been the
most striking, others have done so as well. For example, the Minister of Municipalities, Abd Al-Karim
Yunis Al-Ansari, who is also the Assistant Secretary
General of the Badr Party, supported the militias not
only by visiting fielded units and providing them with
equipment, supplies, and water, but he also participated in operations.67 Falih Al-Khazali, a leader of the
Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ militia, is also a Member of
Parliament and periodically dons his militia uniform
to inspect his fighters at the front. Likewise, Badr
Party sitting Members of Parliament have served as
militia field commanders, while others—such as the
leader of Badr’s parliamentary caucus—also made a
show of appearing at the front in uniform.68 The Secretary-General of the Kata’ib Al-Tayyar Al-Risali militia,
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Shaykh Adnan Al-Shamhani, who is also a Member
of Parliament, has likewise gone in uniform to inspect
his fighters, as is displayed prominently on his organization’s website. Before his appointment, Muhammad Al-Ghabban, as a top Badr figure and Member of
Parliament, had himself joined the Badr militia in field
operations during the summer of 2014 and, even after
being appointed as the new Minister of the Interior in
the Al-Ibadi government and assuming control of the
agency responsible for the militias, was said to still be
leading in the field at times, as in the campaign for Jurf
Al-Sakhr.69
As such, warlords can operate in several dimensions with reinforcing linkages, often functioning as
leaders not only in military operations, but also in
political activity. Since some warlords are also significant Shia clerics and heads of a religious party or of
a religious foundation, they may also be influential
in the religious domain. To be sure, some warlords
are primarily political and religious figures, leaving
combat operations to subordinate commanders. Even
those warlords who are not field commanders, such
as cleric Ammar Al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme
Islamic Council, or Muqtada Al-Sadr, are anxious to
be seen in uniform in the field among their militia
fighters. Other warlords, however, are themselves actual field commanders, as is the case with cleric Ayatollah Qays Al-Khazali, who leads his Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq fighters from the front, and as was true of cleric
Wathiq Al-Battat (killed in December 2014), who led
the Jaysh Al-Mukhtar from the front. In fact, often it is
not possible to distinguish which hat a warlord may
be wearing—whether speaking as a military commander, politician, or religious figure—although that
may not matter, except to underline the overlapping
identities and sources of power of such warlords.
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Warlords wheel and deal as equals with the government leadership, senior military commanders,
tribal leaders, and foreign representatives, and AlHakim, for example, (and perhaps others) meets with
the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.70 Many of the militias,
in fact, can be considered as the armed wing of the
political party to which they are attached and provide
muscle for the latter. For example, Hadi Al-Amiri, the
charismatic leader of the Badr Force, is also the head
of the Badr Party organization, served as Minister of
Transportation under Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki,
and is currently still a Member of Parliament. He has
participated in major operations, and was prominent
in the relief of the besieged town of Amirli (the first
significant defeat for ISIS) and in the Jurf Al-Sakhr
campaign, playing a key role in drafting plans as part
of a joint force with the Army and the police. He deals
as an equal player with Army and police commanders, tribal leaders, and national and local officials,
and has visited and met with political, religious, and
military figures in Iran.
Indicative of such power even in local politics, the
Badr Force appointed one of its own as governor of
Al-Azhim district after helping to expel ISIS from the
area, while the militias are also reputed to run their
own prisons.71 Al-Sadr’s supporters and the Supreme
Islamic Council were said to be expanding their control over the local administration in central and southern Iraq.72 Given the perception that it was the militias
who were the decisive element in stopping ISIS, it is
not surprising that militia warlords are also popular,
at least among the Shia. In a man of the year contest
for political figures at the end of 2014, for example,
Qays Al-Khazali (as leader of the Ahl Al-Haqq) was the
winner, with Badr’s Al-Amiri coming in second.73
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The Militias and the Iranian Connection.
Support for the militias has become a key component of Tehran’s policy in Iraq, which is facilitated by
the fact that most—although not all—of Iraq’s Shia
militias have had a long-standing organizational and
ideological relationship with Iran and, in the case of
some of the warlords, an even longer personal tie. AlAmiri, for example, was a commander of the Badr unit
that fought on Tehran’s side in the Iran-Iraq War of
the 1980s, while most other prominent Badr figures
only returned to Iraq from Iran after the demise of
Saddam Husayn in 2003. As noted already, over the
years, Iran has provided arms and training to many of
these militias through its Quds Division and, according to one Lebanese press source, in recent years some
20,000 Iraqis have been trained by the Quds division.74
In the more recent period, Iran has played an even
more direct role for the Shia militias in Iraq. According
to a Lebanese Hizb Allah report, General Sulaymani,
the veteran commander of the Quds Division, accompanied by Iranian and Lebanese advisers, had landed
at Baghdad’s airport just hours after the fall of Mosul
to ISIS in June 2014, where he was greeted by many
of the Iraqi militia warlords.75 Iran has stressed that
its role is restricted to providing training and advice
in Iraq.76 Lebanese Hizb Allah, which has strong ties to
Tehran, also deployed MOUT and sniper experts who
were used as trainers for volunteers in Iraq, helped
with planning, and provided combat advice and expertise in areas such as defusing explosives.77 Iran has
also provided intelligence support, arms, munitions,
and other equipment, and medical care in Tehran, as
well as occasional air support both to the Iraqi government and to some of the militias directly. Signifi-
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cantly, one of the militias’ priorities had been to secure
the main road between Diyala and the Iranian border
because “That road is very important,” according to
the province’s Chief of Police.78
In many ways, this support has been decisive, as the
number-two man in Badr, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis,
claimed that “the only arms and equipment we received were from Iran [as opposed to the Coalition]”
and “had it not been for those arms and support we
would not have won those victories.”79 What is more,
during the war against ISIS, General Sulaymani and
his staff of advisers were said to have played a key
role in planning and leading operations involving the
Iraqi militias in all major campaigns. In January 2015,
according to Al-Muhandis, there were “hundreds” of
Iranian advisers.80 According to Badr’s official newspaper, Jaridat Badr, just in Diyala province, there were
over 200 Iranian military advisers and fighters operating with the Kurdish Peshmerga—and no doubt also
with the Shia militias deployed in the same area—and
they were said to be especially active in helping to
draft campaign plans.81 Indeed, Al-Hakim complained
that Iran was not included in the Coalition, insisting
that Iran was needed for victory.82
In fact, as Al-Amiri put it, all victories by the militias had been “coordinated” with Sulaymani and
members of IRGC.83 A Lebanese Hizb Allah source
noted that General Sulaymani “was present at all the
major battles side-by-side with the fighters and was
in radio contact with them, refining their plans and
directing their movements, giving his orders to advance toward the enemy lines.”84 Other senior Iranian
officers have also operated in Iraq, with at least three
flag-rank officers killed in action—General Hamid
Taqavi of the IRGC in December 2014, General Mahdi
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Nawruzi from the paramilitary Basij militia (subordinate to the IRGC) in January 2015, and General
Reza Hosseini Moghaddam of the IRGC in February
2015—indicating that senior Iranian personnel have
operated at the front with the militias. While Al-Amiri
has been careful to deny the presence of any Iranian
combat troops in Iraq, he did acknowledge that Iran
provided unspecified fire support.85 The Iranian advisory role, as the spokesman for the Hay’at Al-Hashd AlShabi acknowledged, was continuing undiminished
into 2015.86
Most Iraqi warlords have visited Iran recently and
met with senior government and religious figures.
Iraqi warlords have recognized and applauded Tehran’s support. For example, Ammar Al-Hakim, while
on a visit to Iran, praised Iran for its help and for “the
significant role” it played in the fight against ISIS in
terms of providing “key advice,” logistics support,
and planning and organizational help. In fact, he calculated that, without this help, ISIS would have occupied Arbil in Kurdistan.87 Indeed, underlining the
militias’ view of the importance of Iran’s role, at General Taqavi’s memorial service in Tehran, Al-Amiri
concluded that “Had it not been for Iran and Major
General Sulaymani, Haydar Al-Ibadi’s government
would now be a government-in-exile.”88
In functional terms, one can view some of the
Iraqi militias as extensions of the Iranian security
apparatus, while the close interaction with the militias also provides Tehran with a potent political tool
with which to exert its influence in Iraq. In fact, Iraq’s
Vice-President Ayad Allawi has claimed that Iran has
pressured the Iraqi government to expand the militias
even more.89 Although Iran does not directly control
the militias, nevertheless, the shared experience and
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dependence on Iranian support, within a context of
often congruent interests, has engendered a genuine
symbiosis over time. What is equally significant, as
one can expect, Iraqi warlords and their staffs, as individuals, have often formed close personal ties with
their Iranian counterparts.
Many militias are eager to highlight their ties to
Iran as a means of solidifying their legitimacy. For
example, Badr claimed to have had authority for its
military activity from Khamene’i even before Al-Sistani’s fatwa.90 In fact, several warlords—including the
leaders of Ahl Al-Haqq, Iraqi Hizb Allah, Kata’ib Sayyid
Al-Shuhada’, and Kata’ib Al-Tayyar Al-Risali—openly
recognize Iran’s Ayatollah Khamene’i as God’s representative on earth (wali al-faqih), providing a potent
religious element of allegiance. Khamene’i also appears frequently in Badr’s imagery, including on the
death posters for its fallen fighters. For Iraqi Hizb Allah, there is an additional reinforcing link through the
parent Lebanese Hizb Allah (indeed, both Iraqi and
Lebanese Hizb Allah use the same yellow flag). For
its part, the central Iraqi Shia establishment around
Ayatollah Al-Sistani—and, by extension, the militias
it has fielded—also has a warm relationship with Iran
while retaining its own autonomy. On the other hand,
Al-Sadr, though not openly hostile, is stand-offish toward Tehran, viewing his own family religious pedigree as sufficient legitimacy. Only the eccentric AlSayyid Al-Sarkhi Al-Hasani and his Jaysh Al-Husayn
militia are vociferously anti-Iranian, and he called reliance on Iran “betting on . . . a losing horse,” since he
claimed the latter is so weak, it would collapse in any
confrontation.91
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THE MILITIAS’ OPERATIONAL LEVEL
SIGNIFICANCE—STEMMING THE DISASTER
Not surprisingly, the militias’ performance on the
battlefield has been key to their image and to the warlords’ standing in the country’s socio-political system.
At the time of the levée en masse, the security situation in the fight against ISIS looked grave, if not fatal.
The Army and police seemed to realize they needed
the militias, even if only reluctantly, especially in the
early days when ISIS seemed unstoppable.
With the Iraqi Army reeling and the very real threat
to Baghdad and other parts of Iraq of an ISIS takeover
in 2014, the response by the Shia militias probably
“saved the day,” and in many instances since then,
the militias continued to make the difference between
victory and defeat. In the first Iraqi counteroffensive,
a joint force of security forces and militias (along with
Iranian advisers) was able to relieve the besieged town
of Amirli—the first victory after a series of humiliating defeats by ISIS. After Amirli, even ISIS recognized
that they were now fighting a new war because of the
mobilized militias, and one ISIS analyst remarked that
even senior militia commanders had not held back,
unlike the Iraqi Army commanders in the previous
fighting elsewhere.92
That the militias played the central part in the
Amirli operation is clear. Hadi Al-Amiri—then still
the country’s Minister of Transportation—was wearing his hat of Commander of the Badr Force when he
deployed 2,000 Badr fighters to the Amirli area.93 Once
there, he took an active role, setting up a council as
the coordinating mechanism between the Army and
all the militias, and he himself served on the front
lines.94 It was he and his staff (supported by General
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Sulaymani and his staff) who apparently drafted the
overall operational plan for the relief of the town. A
police spokesman at Amirli noted that Al-Amiri was
in charge (bi-qiyadat) of the operation and that “AlAmiri’s forces” also had “an obvious impact on liberating the nearby Al-Azhim area.”95 In fact, it appears
that Al-Amiri also supervised the subsequent clearing
operation in northern Diyala province, where he was
in charge not only of the militia units but also of the
Army and police, and for which Badr claimed to have
deployed 5,000 of its own fighters.96 Again, the militias were said to have been key in the retaking of the
town of Al-Muqdadiya, also in Diyala province. 97
The militias also made the decisive difference in
other victories over ISIS, as in the campaign to retake
Jurf Al-Sakhr south of Baghdad from August-October
2014, which was described as the single biggest Iraqi
operation since 2003. This is a key area whose control
could have split Baghdad from the south as well as
threatened the capital itself. The Islamic State, abetted
by local Sunni communities, appeared to be succeeding in methodically encircling and cutting off Baghdad
and, as of mid-2014, the Iraqi Army and police were
finding it difficult to stop effectively the adversary in
that area, and five Army commanders in charge of the
operation had been relieved in a span of 2 months.98
Al-Amiri (and the Iranian advisers) again played a
key role in planning the campaign.99 The militias’ willingness to slog it out in the swamps, rugged terrain,
vegetation, and water barriers—all filled with improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—in that region, as well
as to fight in the well-fortified built-up areas, where
the Army’s mechanized units could not operate effectively, was noticeable, as well as that militia personnel
often led the way.100 The veteran militia fighters with
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experience against ISIS in Syria were especially effective in small-unit actions where initiative and leadership were key.
The militias also provided a reserve element for
the defense of Baghdad, preparing to resist ISIS—including with suicide operations—if the Army failed
to hold the city’s defensive belt. As one local Saraya
Al-Salam commander noted, his fighters, in fact, had
had more experience in MOUT than in mobile warfare in any event.101 Hizb Allah apparently used its earlier experience preparing for the city’s defense, using
engineers to erect berms covered with fires south of
Baghdad with the intent of cutting ISIS’s logistics and
taking away the latter’s mobility, noting this would
provide time to react.102
Since then, the militias have continued to be prominent in virtually all the campaigns against ISIS, and
the Iraqi media and government sources have always
been careful to recognize the militias’ role alongside
the Army and police in the official accounts. As one
Iraqi military expert put it in October 2014, the “Islamic resistance” had “changed the course of the war
and achieved outstanding victories;” and, he added,
“If the resistance withdraws from the battlefield . . .
the results in the situation do not bear thinking.”103
Initially, Iraqi Army officers had been dismissive
and hostile to the new militia volunteers, claiming
that many were over age, out of shape, and untrained,
an attitude perhaps also fueled in part by professional pride and resentment of any competition.104
Later, however, as the militias showed their worth,
the Army was “amazed . . . by the ferocity with which
we fought,” according to a commander in the Badr
Force, and there were reports that the Army was full
of praise for the militias.105 As a police officer in Di-
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yala province told a reporter, “We can’t hide the fact
that, without the Shi’ite Asa’ib [Ahl Al-Haqq] militia’s
help, Islamic State flags would be flying on top of the
Baquba government headquarters now.”106 The Iraqi
media widely recognized the Shia volunteers as having been the decisive factor in defeating ISIS at Amirli
and elsewhere.107 Even a provincial Kurdish official
in Diyala joined in the recognition, concluding that
“Were it not for the militias, we would not be exercising government and politics in Baquba.”108 Significantly, Prime Minister Al-Ibadi, in a meeting with
militia commanders, praised the “major role” that the
militias had played in the fighting, labelled their contribution “priceless,” and called them “the backbone
of the security forces.”109
To be sure, as a Member of Parliament noted, it is
difficult for militia units to operate effectively without the Army’s fire support and air power.110 Iraqi
Hizb Allah notes that there is intensive coordination
with the Army and police, including in the sharing of
intelligence, while the militias have provided intelligence for and helped coordinate Iraqi air strikes in
most of the operations.111 Al-Amiri has portrayed the
Army and police in a supporting role to the militias,
although that may well be an exaggeration.112
The militias not only coordinate operations with
the Army, but in many cases are embedded in the
planning process in joint operations rooms so that, in
the case of Al-Amiri, the latter was aware of all future
plans. These joint operations rooms with the Army
have continued into 2015.113 The militias also set up
joint operations rooms with the Kurds.114 For the January 2015 Diyala campaign, Ahl Al-Haqq, for example,
was still coordinating closely with the army, police,
and central and local governments.115 Moreover, it was
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made clear that the Army and militias often share the
same headquarters, as when a Shia religious official
visited a single location to inspect and to hear both the
troops’ and the militia fighters’ complaints.116 In January 2015, when a convoy conveying the Army’s Commander of the Tigris Operations and Al-Amiri was
attacked and the two narrowly missed being struck
by an IED, they were carrying out a joint inspection
tour of the Army and militia units.117 The degree of
coordination between the Army and police, however,
has varied by theater and by individual militia, and
at Samarra, there were separate Army and militia
headquarters.118
In many ways, the militias have provided a valuable complement to the Army’s conventional capabilities. As noted, at least some of the fighters and cadres
had had training and intensive recent combat experience against ISIS in Syria, and some brought to the
battlefield their own crew-served weapons such as artillery and rocket launchers as well as personal arms.
On one occasion, Hizb Allah claimed to have rescued
an Army unit by providing covering fire so it could
withdraw after what the unit claimed was an errant
Coalition air strike that had mistakenly hit near the
Army unit’s position instead of the ISIS position, causing the Army unit to become demoralized and withdraw in a disorganized manner, which ISIS had then
sought to exploit.119
In contrast to recent Army experience, militia leadership was proactive, with commanders leading from
the front and willing to take casualties, and militia at
times outperformed the Army and police tactically, as
the Army and police were often static, showed limited
initiative, and lacked MOUT training.120 It was militia fighters who often took the initiative, for example,
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discovering ISIS tunnels and arms caches in the combat zones, dismantling some 600 IEDs in the town of
Al-Muqdadiya, or developing actionable local intelligence.121 It was Saraya Al-Salam fighters who foiled an
attack against the port of Basra when they discovered
rocket launchers poised to be fired.122
Significantly, militia fighters, motivated by religious zeal or a desire for revenge, displayed a willingness to undergo hardships and to stand and fight,
as well as a high degree of cohesion, a characteristic
reinforced in many instances where recruitment had
followed along tribal lines or in a particular locale.123
The strong backing of the Shia religious establishment,
often reinforced by the fact that some of the warlords
are themselves clerics, provides an additional source
of cohesion, as well as legitimacy. Not only did AlSistani’s original fatwa provide religious sanction, but
senior Shia clerics have continued to go frequently to
the front to visit the militias in order to provide spiritual support and assess their logistics needs.124
Local loyalties, of course, can also pose difficulties,
and, at one point when ISIS seemed dominant and
when an immediate threat loomed over the town of
Karbala, local officials in the latter pressured recentlyvolunteered fighters to return home to defend their
city.125 Muthanna province, too, wanted its fighters
back, as it felt unprotected.126 In fact, the local government in Karbala, as was true of other local authorities,
requested more resources from the central government to train and equip its local fighters. It also campaigned to transfer authority over to, and channel the
requested resources for these local fighters through
the provincial government. This is a reflection of the
perennial contest for power between the central government and centrifugal forces at the local level.127
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The additional numbers of militia fighters were
also a major help in consolidating victories over ISIS,
as that was often a problem for the overextended
Army and police. The security forces, in fact, have usually been unable to replace militia forces once ISIS has
been defeated, as Badr’s spokesman pointed out when
he offered to turn over Diyala province to the security
forces, provided the latter could ensure control.128 According to a leader in Al-Sadr’s movement, despite his
militia’s offers to relinquish control of retaken areas
in order to avoid sectarian problems, the Army and
police often decline, arguing that they lack the manpower.129 In this security vacuum, the militias have
provided a stopgap expedient, often having to engage
in additional combat in secured areas. For example,
the Khuddam Al-Sayyida Zaynab (Servants of Our Lady
Zaynab), deployed to the supposedly cleared Tikrit
area, were forced to launch a spoiling attack against
ISIS units preparing to attack militia field headquarters.130 When operating in Sunni-only areas, however,
these militias may be less effective; for example, in AlAnbar, militia commanders complained that the local
population did not cooperate with them or provide
intelligence against ISIS.131
The militias have also relieved the hard-pressed
Army and police by providing general security in
the south after the Army had deployed into combat.
Militia units that remained in their home areas were
especially useful in patrolling familiar terrain continuously, enabling them, for example, to identify and detain would-be ISIS infiltrators, and obviating the need
for the commitment of Army forces.132 Militias also
provided security for specific events such as Shia religious festivals, as was the case with the 18,000 militia
personnel deployed in Najaf on occasion of the 40th
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Day of Husayn’s Martyrdom celebration, but they
have also undertaken more mundane tasks, such as
cleaning Najaf before a religious holiday.133
The militias’ role in the area of crime, however,
has been somewhat problematic. With the departure
of Army and police units to the front, in many areas a
security vacuum developed that criminal elements exploited, engaging in kidnappings, extortion, and robberies. Often, the perpetrators were gangs claiming
to belong to one of the militias. However, Al-Khazali
acknowledged that some criminals had also joined the
militias for personal gain and as a cover for their illegal
activities.134 In Baghdad in November 2014, the Minister of the Interior appealed to the militias to crack
down on such rogue elements, while also including
measures to regularize the militias’ presence, such as
obligating the latter to register their vehicles, leading
to many arrests of such rogue elements.135
The number of militia casualties is hard to determine since the Iraqi media ordinarily does not disaggregate militia and security forces casualties in reporting. For the campaign in Diyala province through
January 2015, however, the militias lost some 500
dead and over 1,000 wounded.136 While most casualties seem to result from small-scale engagements, occasionally there are also major events in which militia
losses have been significant, such as a suicide attack
during the Jurf Al-Sakhr campaign that left 25 militia dead in October 2014, while a tanker truck bomb
in the Samarra area caused more than 50 casualties in
February 2015.137 Casualties may be underreported in
official tallies, as in one engagement in Diyala in January 2015, off-the-record local medical sources reported some 101 militia and 7 Iranian casualties.138 Given
the disproportionate recruitment from the poorer
segments of society out of economic need, casual34

ties have also been felt most severely in that sector,
at times causing resentment. As one father who had
lost a son complained, the sons of the politicians and
government officials did not join and fight in the militias.139 Aware of the sensitivity and in order to lessen
the impact of casualties, in some cases, the authorities
scheduled individual burials at different times of the
day and in different places.140
THE MILITIAS’ STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL
IMPACT
The militias and the warlords have also had a significant impact at the political level. Despite their stabilizing role from one perspective in helping to turn
the tide against ISIS, the militia warlords at the same
time have also weighed in on, have influenced, or have
triggered a number of political-military issues, some
of which threaten to spark domestic conflict and could
have a serious effect on Iraq’s long-term security and
stability. More precisely, the warlords’ input extends
to concrete policies, which they may introduce, derail,
shape, or delay, depending on the specific circumstances. Many of these issues affect policies—most
often in negative terms—in which the United States
has a direct interest. While the warlords have an influence on most policies, several stand out as especially
significant.
Targeting Urban Areas.
In the fight against ISIS, the Sunnis have complained of indiscriminate government air strikes and
shelling against urban areas which, although aimed at
ISIS, have also caused civilian casualties, and which
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the Sunnis have often seen as an intentional way to
punish all Sunnis. While the government under Prime
Minister Al-Ibadi in 2014 committed itself to end
strikes against urban areas, in practice this has been
difficult to achieve, not least because of pressure on
the government by the militias. The latter and their
constituents have argued that restraint in bombing
and shelling would only help ISIS. For example, a Badr
Member of Parliament (who is also a militia field commander) complained that the government’s moratorium on such operations was hampering the defeat of
ISIS.141 There is widespread support within the broader
Shia community for the militias’ stand and, typically,
a leading cleric in Basra demanded the government
resume air strikes against cities as part of the fight
against ISIS.142 Sunni organizations in Iraq—some of
which have cooperated with ISIS—on the other hand
have pressured the United States not to target urban
areas.143 In practice, such operations have continued,
generating continued Sunni discontent.
Creating a National Guard.
The United States has promoted the creation of a
National Guard, with medium and heavy weapons
and maneuver units focused on the Sunni areas as a
mechanism to provide security and as reassurance to
the country’s Sunni community. Sunni leaders have
supported the concept of a National Guard strongly,
viewing it as a Sunni Army and as a basic guarantee
for their community.
However, the project was slow in getting off the
ground, not least because of obstruction by the warlords, who no doubt saw this force as a competitor
and as a threat to the authority of the central govern-
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ment in which they had a stake, not to speak of the
sectarian aspect. The process was not made easier
by the fact that, for many Sunnis—including Sunni
Members of Parliament—the mission of the planned
National Guard was to be not only against ISIS but
also “to get rid of the [Shia] militias” from the Sunni
provinces.144 Shia warlords raised a number of objections intended to delay, if not derail, the establishment of the National Guard. Al-Amiri, for example,
expressed his reservations about forming the National
Guard, calling the plan “hasty.”145 Hizb Allah claimed
the National Guard would partition the country.146
One Badr Member of Parliament, for his part, opposed
the National Guard’s having heavy weapons, at least
in the immediate future.147 In their opposition, the militias were able to rely on a broad-based Shia hostility
to such a force. Even the senior Shia clerics expressed
their reluctance for a basically Sunni National Guard,
arguing that it was better not to rely on sectarian and
ethnic structures although, given the same clerics’
involvement with the Shia militias, that stance may
appear hypocritical.148
More broadly, the warlords and their spokesmen
often demanded that volunteers from all communities be allowed to join, thereby likely ensuring a Shia
majority, with Al-Sadr insisting specifically that militia units also be incorporated into any such new
force.149 Some warlords and Shia politicians stated
they would accept the National Guard, provided
it was organized on a nationwide basis and with its
own government ministry, whereby they presumably
could exercise their own influence in the new force
and compete with the military.150 One Member of Parliament even proposed that the Shia militias should
be the nucleus for any National Guard.151 Sensitive to
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this entrenched opposition, the Prime Minister’s office
felt it prudent to coordinate the establishment of the
National Guard with the militias and even to suggest
that the latter could constitute “the nucleus” for the
National Guard.152
Rehabilitating the Baathists.
Closely related to the National Guard issue was
whether to rescind the punitive laws against Baathists
and Saddam-era officers and to reintegrate them into
society, as the Sunnis have requested. Specifically, the
Sunnis assumed that the leadership for the National
Guard was to be provided by recruiting former officers in Saddam’s Army (who would ordinarily have
joined the Baath Party and had had Sunni tribal links),
and the local media reported that a visiting U.S. delegation had actually met with veteran officers for
that purpose.153 On the contrary, according to a Badr
leader, the new Badr Minister of the Interior was intent on purging “all Baathist officers and anyone with
Baathist sympathies.”154 Jaysh Al-Mukhtar even vowed
to exterminate the Baathists if the latter were rehabilitated.155 In any event, the Shia refused to disband the
Accountability and Justice Committee, which investigated Baathists, as the Sunnis had hoped, as part of a
deal to establish the National Guard.
Détente with the Gulf States.
As Prime Minister, Al-Ibadi has pursued a policy
of détente with Iraq’s neighbors and, in particular,
with the Gulf States, but the militia warlords have often complicated the effort, displaying particular hostility toward Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab
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Emirates (UAE). There had already been a stormy
history between some of the militias and these states,
which was often fueled by religious friction. For example, Abu Al-Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the number-two
man in Badr and in the Hay’at Al-Hashd Al-Shabi, had
been sentenced to death in absentia by Kuwait in connection with an alleged attempt on the latter country’s ruler in 1983. Likewise, in 2013, the Ahl Al-Haqq
had shelled a Saudi border post in protest to what it
claimed was Saudi interference in Iraq.
More recently, such irritants as the arrest and trial
of prominent Shia clerics in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein,
accusations of the Gulf States’ funding and arming ISIS
and the Sunni community, and the UAE’s call in November 2014 to place a number of the Iraqi militias on
the international terrorist list have raised the militias’
ire, as has the Saudi media’s promotion of the outsider
warlord, Al-Sarkhi. Militia warlords have also viewed
Saudi Arabia’s willingness to support lower oil prices and its decision to maintain production levels as
targeting Iraqi interests. Al-Amiri has portrayed the
Gulf States as ingrates, arguing that it was Iraq’s militias and Al-Sistani’s fatwa that had saved them from
ISIS.156 To a certain extent, Prime Minister Al-Ibadi
has had to accommodate such views, as he explained
his opposition to Arab air strikes in Iraq as part of the
Coalition in terms of suspecting that Saudi Arabia
would also target the militias.157 Indicative of the implied disruptive power that the militias can wield, the
Iraqi media reported that Prime Minister Al-Ibadi had
made sure to check with the political parties that have
militias (as well as with Iran) to obtain their assurance
that they would not oppose the reopening of the Saudi
embassy in Baghdad.158
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Sharing a Battlefield.
Unavoidably, the presence and activity of the Shia
militias also have an impact on U.S. interests and policy at both the strategic and operational levels. Clearly,
many of the issues noted previously intersect with
U.S. policy considerations, some more directly than
others. Some of the militias have a history of violent
confrontation with U.S. forces dating back to the postSaddam period. More recently, most militias have displayed a more muted but still hostile attitude toward
the United States, although such hostility has been
modulated for those militias loyal to Iran, as the latter
has engaged in its own rapprochement with Washington, the centerpiece of which has been the negotiating
process surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
Even so, there is skepticism and hostility in militia
circles toward the United States which cannot be discounted. In January 2015, Al-Sadr’s party even tried
to have Parliament abrogate the existing U.S.-Iraqi
Security Agreement.159 Should bilateral U.S.-Iranian
relations deteriorate, that could mean a sharpening of
militia hostility in Iraq as well. As it is, for example,
Iraqi Hizb Allah has stated that it would deal with foreign troops as with occupiers, which Iran—perhaps as
a subtle warning of its own—was eager to report in its
own media, adding that one of the options the United
States was considering was using “the pretext of fighting ISIS” to introduce ground troops.160
Shia warlords express negative views of U.S. policy either directly or through the political parties they
lead or the media they control. Since many of the militias have their own websites, newspapers, radio and
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TV stations, and well-developed social media skills,
they can get their message out effectively. The Shia
warlords, and Shia opinion in general, see any U.S.
policy against a backdrop of a greater alleged strategy of Washington’s expansion in the region. Badr,
for example, has claimed that U.S. policy in Iraq was
part of “a secret plan to remake the Middle East.”161 A
common theme is that the U.S. fight against ISIS is not
genuine and merely a pretext to re-occupy Iraq; that
its intent is to weaken Iraq in order to increase Israel’s
security; that the United States created ISIS; and, as a
Sadrist Member of Parliament claimed, that the U.S.
intent was to break up Iraq.162 The official Badr newspaper, in fact, accused the United States of wanting
to reestablish its influence in the Middle East through
the fight against ISIS, characterizing the policy as “soft
colonialist power.”163
There is already a general resentment in militia
circles of the U.S. personnel, stemming from an unease with the growing number of U.S. advisers, as was
the case after an increase in November 2014, when a
Sadrist Member of Parliament, while praising the militias, warned of “interference in Iraq’s affairs” and
of a stealth return of American influence, while Ahl
Al-Haqq complained that Parliament should have discussed the issue before increasing the number of trainers.164 In that overall political atmosphere, even the appearance of cooperating with the Americans is to be
avoided, as, for example, militiamen left Al-Asad base
in Al-Anbar after U.S. trainers arrived in November
2014.165 Such concern over even implying cooperation with Americans is legitimated by support within
Shia clerical circles at the highest levels, as Ayatollah
Al-Sistani has warned Iraqi leaders that foreign help
should not be “an entrée to trample the independence
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of political and military decisionmaking” for Iraq,
while Al-Sistani’s representative warned the Coalition not to prepare for “a permanent war” in Iraq and
stressed the need to respect Iraq’s sovereignty and
independence.166
Although most militias grudgingly accept Iraq’s
current need for U.S. air and training support, some
warlords, such as Hadi Al-Amiri, have dismissed altogether—at least for show—the need for Coalition
support, especially once the situation had stabilized,
arguing that the Army and militias could liberate
Iraq.167 Moreover, the militias’ media frequently provides a message to the effect that the Coalition has not
been doing enough, and is not effective, against ISIS.
Militias have spread rumors that the United States did
not really want to target ISIS effectively since, as one
Badr Member of Parliament put it, the U.S. intent was
only to use ISIS’s presence to divide Iraq and get at its
oil resources.168 As a corollary, a consensus among the
warlords developed—and a position echoed by Iran—
that the Coalition was not committed and that it would
fail in uprooting ISIS terrorism, with Al-Amiri calling
reliance on the Coalition “a mirage.”169 At the same
time, the militias have also criticized repeatedly what
they saw as U.S. delays in fulfilling stalled arms agreements and interpreted that as part of a hostile policy
designed to help ISIS.170 To a great extent, such militia
views are often reinforced by other prominent figures
in the Shia community. Al-Sistani’s representative, for
example, has also claimed that the West wants to divide Iraq.171 Militia priorities may differ from those of
the United States in terms of phasing the liberation of
territory, with the militias in early-2015 favoring Salah
Al-Din province first as opposed to U.S. preferences
for a Mosul-first effort.172
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The U.S. military has already been operating in
the same battlespace as the militias, whether with air
operations, training missions, or even providing unwilling support, as in arming the militias, even if only
indirectly. For example, according to unnamed U.S. senior officials, arms that the United States had supplied
to the Iraqi government for use by the country’s military have been transferred to the militias.173 In a sense,
the U. S. military has already de facto collaborated in
“combined” operations with some militias, which operate alongside regular Iraqi Army units, by providing air support to some campaigns. Conversely, the
militias have had to acknowledge the reality of a U.S.
presence in the fight against ISIS, if only because of the
need to avoid being struck in error from the air which,
given the fluid situation on the ground and often poor
air-ground deconfliction, takes on added importance.
Recognizing this factor, militia operations at times, as
in the fight for the town of Bayji, have had to proceed
more slowly out of concern for possible misplaced
air strikes.174
The militias have used U.S. operations to fuel resentment with claims intended to reflect America’s
alleged hostile intentions. For example, militias have
claimed that U.S. air strikes had struck their forces deliberately, as was the case with both Muqtada Al-Sadr
and Hizb Allah.175 Even more intense was the recurring propaganda campaign, echoed by Iran, that the
United States was air-dropping arms and supplies to
ISIS. Al-Hakim’s political spokesmen, for example,
explained that the reason for such alleged U.S. help to
ISIS was that Washington wanted to prolong the war
and thereby attrit Iraq’s manpower.176 While errant
air-drops may well have landed in ISIS-controlled
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areas on the fluid battlefield, the militias portrayed
this as a willful policy intended to help ISIS in support
of U.S. interests.
The close proximity of militia and U.S. forces, combined with militia hostility, carries the risk of potential
confrontations. In February 2015, Hizb Allah claimed
to have fired on a U.S. helicopter on the ground, which
it asserted had airlifted ISIS fighters, prompting Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee to authorize shooting down any aircraft on such a mission.177
The militia factor will be even more relevant for
any ground presence of U.S. Army personnel—including those engaged in a training mission—as well as for
other U.S. and allied military and civilian government
personnel, or contractors.178 Moreover, the media has
reported on some U.S., British, and Canadian Special
Forces engaged in combat, which could heighten the
potential for contact and friction.179
In practical terms, the militias—in particular those
that have close ties to Iran and the Lebanese Hizb Allah—will likely collect intelligence on U.S. systems,
organization, and techniques; engage in hostile propaganda; and may constitute an operational security
and force protection risk, due to their long history
of hostility toward the United States and clashing
interests with the latter; any information they collect likely would be passed on to the Iranians. Such
militia attitudes place limits on U.S. policy options
and at some point could also engender friction on the
ground, leading to anti-American violence by members of some militias even if no U.S. ground combat
elements are introduced, given the multiplicity of
militias and the challenges of command and control.
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Pre-empting the Option of Coalition
Ground Forces.
Although the deployment of ground combat forces
into Iraq has perhaps not been a serious policy consideration from the American side, this has been a major issue for Iraqis, who have seen the possibility as
either something to be encouraged or to be opposed,
usually depending on their communal identity and
interests. As one might expect, Sunni leaders, as was
the case with Sahwa leader, Ahmad Abu Risha, have
been vocal proponents of a U.S. ground intervention
against ISIS, in great part to forestall a presence of the
Shia militias and the Iraqi Army (which they view as
largely Shia) in their areas.180 A Member of Parliament
representing Al-Anbar, from the Sunni Ittihad Al-Quwa Al-Wataniya party, in fact, argued openly that the
Coalition represents Sunni interests and expressed his
strong support for a foreign ground presence.181 Some
Al-Anbar officials even threatened to stop fighting
against ISIS unless the Iraqi government made a commitment to approve a U.S. ground presence.182
Conversely, all the Shia warlords have adamantly
rejected any such ground combat presence, based
both on ideological and power interest motives. For
example, Al-Hakim opposed either regional or Coalition ground forces in Iraq and when he met General
(Ret.) John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the
Global Coalition against ISIS, in October 2014, he reportedly told the latter outright that the Iraqis opposed
ground forces and just wanted U.S. weapons.183 Sadr
Al-Din Al-Qubanchi, the main imam in Najaf and a
leading figure in the Supreme Islamic Council, not
only opposed a Coalition ground presence but even
urged that the Coalition provide weapons and money
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for the militias instead.184 Iraqi Hizb Allah, for its part,
warned that U.S. ground forces would be a step in the
United States’ “plan to re-occupy Iraq” and concluded that “we will not permit America’s return in any
form,” expressing its displeasure already by what it
claimed were U.S. officers directing operations.185 Ahl
Al-Haqq’s leader, Qays Al-Khazali, likewise, opposed
U.S. ground forces, stating that “we will not accept
any foreign troops in Iraq,” and preferred that Washington just arm Iraq, while voicing his suspicion that
Washington would introduce ground forces in order
to partition the country as a way to enhance Israel’s
security.186
Several of the militias have hinted what their reaction would be if there were a foreign ground intervention, perhaps seeking to forestall such an option.
For example, Badr’s leader Al-Amiri warned that his
militia’s personnel would “refuse outright to fight
under an American umbrella.”187 Highlighting the
difficulty often in distinguishing intersecting roles of
militia figures, the Minister of Municipalities, who is
also the Assistant Secretary General of the Badr Party,
likewise spoke with his party/militia hat on in opposing the presence of foreign ground troops.188 For their
part, Hizb Allah and the Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ also
stated their refusal to cooperate with the United States
and threatened to leave their positions if U.S. ground
forces were deployed.189 In late October 2014, in fact,
Al-Sadr ordered the Saraya Al-Salam to begin a phased
withdrawal from areas in which they had been operating, ostensibly irked that some in the government had
urged a U.S. ground presence.190
Some militias even threatened to oppose any U.S.
ground combat forces actively and, for example, Ahl
Al-Haqq warned that it would fight against any such
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presence.191 Al-Sadr, too, threatened that if the United
States deployed ground forces, his militia not only
would withdraw from the front immediately but, he
added, “If you return, we will return . . . we will make
you taste the woes of your decision, which you will
regret.”192 A Member of Parliament from Al-Sadr’s
party added that “If they [i.e., the Americans] are
thinking of returning, that will mean digging their
own graves.”193 There were reports that Iran in September 2014 had sent guidance to those militias loyal
to Tehran to pressure Prime Minister Al-Ibadi not to
allow U.S. ground combat forces, threatening to stop
their own operations otherwise.194
Such skepticism of and opposition to a U.S. ground
presence is shared and supported by broad segments
of Shia public opinion in the country. Recognizing
that a large and visible U.S. ground presence would
be unpopular within the Shia community in general,
Prime Minister Al-Ibadi and other senior officials have
gone out of their way to reassure their power base that
they, too, are opposed to that. Reflecting both the direct impact of warlords within the government and
the perceived need even within pro-Western circles to
accommodate such domestic fears, Al-Ibadi came out
repeatedly against any foreign ground troop presence
in Al-Anbar, stressing the need for only international
air support, armaments, and efforts to cut off funding to ISIS.195 In a meeting with Al-Sistani in October
2014, Prime Minister Al-Ibadi reportedly was careful to reassure the latter that no U.S. ground troops
would come.196
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THE MILITIAS, SECTARIANISM,
AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
Ultimately, national reconciliation among Iraq’s
sectarian and ethnic components will be essential to
bring about genuine stability and security. However,
communal relations in the country remain tense, in no
small part because of the militias’ activity, although
the Sunni and the Kurdish communities also bear a
share of responsibility for the situation.
The Militias and the Sunnis.
The increased prominence of the Shia militias has
exacerbated in many ways the Sunni community’s
long-standing grievances and fears of a hostile or indifferent Shia-dominated government and represents
a major obstacle in achieving national reconciliation.
Both Ayatollah Al-Sistani and several of the top warlords have stressed publicly that they fight for Iraq as
a whole and that they oppose sectarianism (al-ta’ifiya).
Al-Sadr at one point even ordered the Saraya Al-Salam
to replace the Al-Sadr insignias on their uniforms with
the map of Iraq in order not to give the impression that
this was a sectarian war.197 However, Al-Sadr has also
equated the enemy in sectarian terms as “the killers
of Husayn,” a damning image as persecutors of one
of the holiest figures in Shia doctrine.198 The religious
coloring of the Shia militias is inescapable. Not only
are they in many cases created and led by Shia clerics, but the names of the militia units, the mottos they
use, the banners they fly in addition to the Iraqi flag,
and the posters they display are clearly from the Shia
tradition. Typically, the Firqat Al-Abbas Al-Qitaliya’s
inaugural parade in Karbala had culminated at the
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central Husayn shrine.199 In October 2014, militiamen
renewed their oath in Shia shrines. Shia clerics serve
as chaplains with the deployed militia units or go to
the field to raise morale, preach on religion, and explain geo-political issues, focusing especially on “why
we fight.”200 Even Prime Minister Al-Ibadi, while condemning sectarianism, has sometimes also played to
Shia sentiments to encourage cohesion, calling the
population to follow the “lesson from Imam Husayn’s
path in order to defeat the Umma’s enemies.”201
Many in the Sunni community see the Shia militia
as a threat, and the militias’ actions continue to fuel
deeply felt grievances that will delay or even prevent
the detachment of the Sunni community from ISIS, as
well as provide tinder for future conflict. Militia operations in Sunni areas have long been controversial,
especially in Al-Anbar province, the hotbed of Sunni
protest against the former Al-Maliki government and
a source of local support for ISIS. Typically, when Ahl
Al-Haqq deployed a unit of 300 to Al-Anbar in November 2014, the local tribes complained that they did not
want the militias but arms, equipment, and logistic
support instead.202
Reflecting a widespread Sunni perception, a Member of Parliament stressed that military operations
often have an anti-Sunni character irrespective of the
Sunnis’ ideology.203 Many Sunnis, in fact, argue that
the Baghdad government and the Shia militias lump
all Sunnis together as terrorists, and that all Sunnis are
victims of a systematic policy of revenge.204 A cleric
in Fallujah even accused the Baghdad government of
conducting operations intended to “exterminate the
Sunnis.”205
Iraq’s Sunni media and religious circles specifically address the issue of militia crimes constantly (al-
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ways using the term, milishiya, in its pejorative Iraqi
sense), and this issue has been a major source of Sunni
alienation. Sunni politicians have been outspoken in
their recriminations against the warlords, with one
Sunni Member of Parliament, for example, calling the
leader of the Ahl Al-Haqq a “Shia criminal,” and using
the pejorative term “Safavid” for Shia.206 In Al-Anbar,
Sunni politicians accused militias such as the Saraya
Al-Salam of committing atrocities under the pretext of
liberating the province and argued that it was better to
arm the local Sunnis instead.207
Sunnis accuse the Shia militias of committing
crimes against the Sunni population in a systematic
manner—whether from political motivation, religious
animosity, personal gain, or revenge—including killing civilians, kidnapping, torching houses, extorting businesses, looting, destroying palm groves, and
ethnic cleansing; international observers have confirmed many of these accusations.208 Militias—and
the Army—are sometimes accused of conducting
scorched-earth operations and, in Diyala province,
militias were said to engage in collective punishment,
retaliating for IEDs planted by ISIS by shooting local
Sunni residents.209 Ethnic cleansing at times appears to
be methodical and part of policy, as local Sunni critics
have charged that the militias were preventing Sunni
refugees from returning to Diyala province in areas
along the border with Iran, evidently a point of concern for the latter as well as for those Iraqis intent on
securing land access to Iran.210
In fact, a Sunni coalition mounted a campaign,
which included sending a petition to the White
House, asking that the Shia militias be included on the
international list of terrorist organizations, although
the Iraqi government blocked a local satellite channel
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promoting the petition.211 Deputy Prime Minister Salih Al-Mutlag, a Sunni, for his part, wanted the Coalition to target the Shia militias as well as ISIS with its
air strikes.212 In Diyala province, Sunnis formed their
own units specifically to defend against “the terrorist militias” and asked for government support.213
Frustrated tribes and Members of Parliament from AlAnbar complained that the government, for political
reasons, was willing to arm the Shia militias, but not
the Sunni tribes. Militia sources countered that seeking arms for the tribes was just a vehicle for arming
the jihadis, accusing some tribes of selling weapons
to ISIS.214
On occasion, Army officers have confronted illdisciplined militiamen and exchanged fire over the
latter’s actions, such as torching Sunni homes.215 However, overall, Sunni sources argue that government
forces do nothing to restrain the militias. Sunnis also
complain that the legal route does not provide redress,
as they say that courts support the militias.216 In addition, Iraq’s Sunnis—even those hostile to ISIS—have
been exasperated that the Coalition, in their view, was
ignoring their treatment at the hands of the Shia militias.217 Such perceptions may well affect the Sunnis’ relationship with the government, and some may even
see ISIS as providing a shield against the Shia. As one
Sunni Member of Parliament noted, “They [i.e., the
Shia militias] arrest people, and nobody knows where
they are taken. . . . This makes so many people want
to volunteer with [the] Islamic State to fight the militias.”218 In support of that conclusion, Sunnis in the
area south of Baghdad were said to often favor ISIS
specifically as protection against the Shia militias.219
As a result of the military operations and, no doubt
of militia policies, there was an increase in Sunni refu-
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gees who, according to the Chief of Police of Diyala,
had become a willing pool of recruits for ISIS, with
only women, children, and the old remaining in some
refugee camps.220
Militias have routinely denied any wrongdoing
against the Sunnis or have contended any such occurrences were only isolated cases. Often, their supporters in the government have backed them up. Thus,
Iraq’s Ministry for Human Rights (headed by a member of the Badr Party, Muhammad Al-Bayati) rejected
outright the accusations by Amnesty International of
sectarian massacres, arguing that the militias are part
of the Iraqi military and that the allegations could not
be proven.221 Only occasionally have militia warlords
acknowledged, even if only in general terms, violations of human rights, and some warlords at least
have verbally condemned such conduct. For example,
Al-Sadr disavowed those members of his own militia
who had been involved in executing prisoners and
nearby Sunni villagers after the relief of Amirli, condemning retaliation and calling for “an end of hate.”222
Al-Hakim also met with his militiamen and stressed
the need to follow orders and to maintain discipline.223
The top Shia religious authority, Al-Sistani, also acknowledged a problem. Aware of violations in the
field, he censured the “few undisciplined elements
who, by their actions, give a bad name to the volunteers,” and reminded fighters that it was forbidden
to attack any innocent civilians but, at the same time,
cautioned politicians not to generalize the behavior of
what he said was a minority of wrongdoers to the majority of militia fighters, and cautioned that it was necessary to continue supporting the fighters to achieve
victory.224 Again, in late January 2015 as Diyala was
being cleared, both Al-Sistani and Al-Amiri reiterated
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the need to protect private property, although AlAmiri also equated critics to ISIS fellow travelers.
However, whether such verbal reproaches will
translate into effective measures on the ground is questionable, as command and control at the local level
may be weak and discipline hard to enforce, especially
given the emotions that may play a role. Significantly,
as Diyala was being cleared, even Sunni tribes allied
to the government against ISIS complained of attacks
by the Army and militias against homes, mosques,
and individuals.225 The fact that in January 2015 AlAmiri became head of the committee charged with the
return of refugees to Diyala or that a hardline Sadrist
Member of Parliament, Hakim Al-Zamili, is head of
a committee tasked with investigating a massacre of
Sunni civilians, may not help matters. What is more,
senior government officials, including the Minister of
the Interior and the Minister of Defense, have often
either cast doubt on or dismissed outright accusations
of wrongdoing by the militias. Even Prime Miniser AlIbadi, perhaps motivated by expediency and a sense
of a continuing need for the militias, refused to accuse the latter of war crimes, claiming that the alleged
crimes had not been committed by either the Army or
the militias; or he attributed such accusations to “politics” and equated their critics to a fifth column.226
Barring effective measures by the Baghdad government to address the issue of the militias’ mistreatment
of Sunni civilians, the Sunnis’ negative perceptions
are likely to fester and to hamper operations against
ISIS. To be sure, the Sunni community itself is fragmented, and some tribes have become disillusioned by
the lack of government support in their fight against
ISIS. They resent what they claim is the government’s
reluctance to arm and pay them while supporting the
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militias lavishly. For example, the Al Bu Nimr tribe,
which had been battered by ISIS and feeling that the
government had abandoned it, felt it had no choice
but to arrive at an understanding with Al-Sadr, who
promised to provide arms and training and, eventually, sent 2,000 personnel from the Saraya Al-Salam to
Al-Anbar in November 2014. However, most Sunni
tribes in Al-Anbar have developed a deep distrust of
the Shia militias and, according to one Sunni leader,
“there is fear of the militias’ arrival . . . and of a repetition of what occurred in Diyala, Jurf Al-Sakhr, and AlWafa’ south of Al-Ramadi, when the militias torched
civilians’ houses, looted their property, and killed
them by the dozen after liberating the areas,” while
a tribal chief asked “Why do we need the militias?
We are beginning to have doubts about the militias’
entering Al-Ramadi.”227
In this charged atmosphere, any incident can escalate quickly, as was the case when the militias allegedly interrogated and then executed two residents
of Al-Ramadi in February 2015. The killings sparked
rage within Al-Anbar, prompting tribal chiefs to demand the militias leave the province, and obliging
Prime Minister Al-Ibadi to intervene personally to
investigate the matter.228 However, members of both
communities have been guilty of sectarian massacres,
which provide ongoing flashpoints and make it difficult to quell passions. Significantly, the Ahl Al-Haqq
code-named its campaign in Salah Al-Din province
“Revenge for the Speicher Martyrs,” referring to the
Shia cadets massacred by ISIS, allegedly aided by
local Sunni tribes.229
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The Militias and the Kurds.
Although muted at present, there is also the potential for friction between the Shia militias and the
Kurdish community, centering on control of territory,
oil revenues, and the concept of decentralization or
central control. To be sure, the Kurdish Peshmerga
and the militias (as well as the Army) have cooperated in military operations against ISIS as the common
enemy. Despite the current cooperation, there have
also been indications that this relationship could fray
in the future as control over liberated areas that are
mixed comes into question.
Many Iraqis (Shia and Sunni) resent what they see
as the Kurds having taken advantage of the weakness
of the Iraqi government and military to seize the contested oil-rich Kirkuk area and other parts of Diyala.
They fear further Kurdish expansion as additional
ISIS-held territory is liberated, especially in light of
the Kurdistan Regional Government’s open statement
after the liberation of the Sanjar area in December
2014 that it would annex the latter to Kurdistan. Badr
was critical of the landmark agreement Baghdad had
worked out with Kurdistan on revenue sharing.
A Kurdish Member of Parliament accused the central government of conducting a sectarian policy by
stationing the militias in the liberated areas in Diyala
province and using them to carry out an Arabization
policy to the detriment of Kurdish interests.230 The
Kurds, for their part, have also been accused of carrying out ethnic cleansing and refused to allow militia
units to be raised in the disputed Kirkuk and Mosul
areas. This is critical in that the Baghdad government
had proposed $3 billion to buy arms for the militias
to garrison those two areas.231 In fact, the Peshmerga
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have repeatedly demanded—unsuccessfully—that
the militias relinquish to them control of the areas
that the latter liberated in that province.232 Al-Hakim,
among others, has gone out of his way to remind the
Kurds that Kurdistan is still part of Iraq, while Badr
has accused the Kurds of exploiting the militias’ victories for their own benefit.233 Shortly after the siege
of Amirli was lifted in a joint effort, the Badr Force
seized several key checkpoints and offices in the town
from the Kurdish Peshmerga, while in January 2015,
the Kurds detained a dozen militiamen following a
dispute and ensuing firefight.234 In February 2015,
Kurdish officials warned that any attempt by the militias to enter Kirkuk—a continuing ethnic flashpoint—
would be met by force.235 On one occasion, General
Sulaymani, highlighting the influence he has with the
militias, reportedly hurried to the scene in the mixed
Diyala province in order to defuse friction between
the militias and the Peshmerga over accusations by
the latter that the militias were ethnically cleansing
local Kurds.236 Such friction adds a complication to
the campaign to retake Mosul and could involve the
militias in further confrontations.
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE:
REALITIES AND IMPLICATIONS
The warlords no doubt keep an eye down the
road, on the post-ISIS period as well as on the present, and are laying the foundations for a reshaped
national power balance in which they and their parties would gain greater influence. A number of factors
are likely to affect the developing situation and could
have significant implications for Iraq’s future and for
U.S. interests.
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A Continuing Need for the Militias.
Barring a significant foreign ground combat presence, Iraqis will perceive a continuing need for the militias in the effort against ISIS for some time to come.
Rebuilding the Iraqi Army—which had been hobbled
by corruption, poor leadership, absentee soldiers, insufficient training, ineffective logistics, and shaky morale during the Al-Maliki era—into an effective force
will not happen quickly. Both Lieutenant General
James Terry, the commander leading the U.S. military
mission in Iraq, and Prime Minister Al-Ibadi acknowledged in January 2015 that this process could take 3
years.237 The militias complain of problems in joint
operations with the Army, due to ineffective Army officers, and report that some Army officers ran away
or withdrew their units, leaving the militia volunteers
behind, and that government air support often arrived
late.238 According to an Iraqi military analyst, even into
2015, the Army still was poor at coordinating among
its own units, lacked a national operations center, only
maneuvered in large units, lacked sufficient MOUT
skills, and was slow and visible, leaving it vulnerable to the more agile ISIS’s small unit tactics.239 Even
Prime Minister Al-Ibadi told militia commanders in
February 2015 that their militias were “the key pillar
of our system,” since the Army “is not structured for
anti-guerrilla operations.”240
The Iraqi Army has also lacked a sufficient manpower base to meet its multiple demands. This shortcoming is linked to the problem of Iraq’s “ghost”
soldiers (fada’iyun, literally “empty-space men,” or
wahmiyun, literally “imaginary men”)—personnel
existing only on paper, with officials and officers syphoning off the imaginary soldiers’ salaries, allowing
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troops to go home for a share of their pay, or having
them work in the officers’ private companies. According to one Iraqi source, as of November 2014, there
were said to be more than 200,000 such ghost soldiers
in the military, although others placed the number at
50,000.241 Despite Al-Ibadi’s vigorous efforts to end
this practice, reform will take time, as the problem
was entrenched at the highest levels of the political
and military systems and is endemic in the police,
most government ministries, and economic and social
institutions—including 60,000 ghost security guards
for the Members of Parliament—so that many entrenched interests who stand to lose will likely drag
their feet on reform.242 Even in January 2015, according to a Member of Parliament from Al-Anbar, only 25
percent of the Army personnel on the roster for duty
in the province were actually available for combat.243
Moreover, Kurdish forces also may only provide
limited support as further campaigns unfold against
ISIS, depending on Kurdish interests. As Nechirvan
Barzani—the provincial Prime-Minister of Kurdistan—stressed in January 2015, the Kurds would fight
for “areas that rightfully belonged to the Kurdish region and would avoid using peshmerga fighters to
drive Islamic State fighters from Sunni areas or retake
Mosul.”244
Thinking and Debating Reorganization.
Given the likelihood of the militias’ continued
significance, it is not surprising that there has been a
trend to institutionalize the Hay’at Al-Hashd Al-Shabi
(Popular Hashd Agency) administration as a new center of power. By December 2014, responsibility for the
Hay’a had been transferred from the Ministry of the
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Interior to the Cabinet, suggesting an intent to centralize and establish a more permanent stand-alone
structure. Indications in early-2015 pointed to the development of a more professional organization for the
Hay’a with its own administrative directorates, intelligence, security, and coordination capabilities.245
The country has seen the establishment in many
ways of a parallel army and, perhaps, the militia force
may develop into an equivalent of the IRGC or the
Basij in Iran, with additional equipment and professionalization, in tandem with the regular army. Some
in the Hay’a administration have proposed an expansion of the existing Hay’a by creating new units and
staffing them with the current militia fighters as individuals without their present militia units’ names and
flags and placing the expanded force directly under
the Hay’a’s command, essentially creating a parallel
force similar to the IRGC.246 It is unclear how the individual militia warlords might react to such proposals.
At the time, only Al-Sadr, often a maverick, appeared
to agree to an end of the militias by full integration
into the Army.247
However, the coalition nature of individual competitive militias and warlords jealous of their autonomy may well preclude such an amalgamation. For
example, while the militias graduated a better-trained
Special Forces unit by January 2015, indicating a trend
toward professionalization, even the new contingent
was then incorporated into the Badr Force.248 In practice, each militia operates according to its own interests. Al-Amiri was fully aware that the militias are far
from united and rued that they thus did not achieve
their full operational potential because of their autonomy.249 For now at least, the government, Army, and
police have only tenuous operational control over the

59

militias. For example, municipal authorities can appeal directly to militia leaders and bypass the government chain of command, as was the case for the embattled town of Duluiya, which asked for Al-Amiri’s
help in repulsing ISIS attacks.250
Although the National Guard project eventually
passed by a narrow margin within the Cabinet in February 2015, it looked as if it would face further hurdles
before the full Parliament because of unresolved issues, including its relationship to the militias. Iran was
said to be promoting the transformation of the militias
into the National Guard and, in fact, the spokesman
of the Hay’a proposed changing the latter’s name to
the National Guard, in essence making the militias
the core of the new organization, which would defeat
the original intent of the National Guard and alienate the Sunnis.251 As it was, in order to make the National Guard acceptable to the Shia, the punitive laws
against the Baathists remained in force, complicating
efforts to recruit Saddam-era officers.
Translating Prestige into Power.
Success on the battlefield against ISIS has provided
the militias with popularity, as well as military muscle,
that can be translated into political power. The warlords’ present-day operations and political activity are
intertwined, and the warlords will work to shape the
situation so that they can institutionalize a greater role
for themselves in the future. Nuri Al-Maliki, still a political player even after his ouster as Prime Minister,
for example, was critical of Badr, accusing the latter of
using military operations for “electoral propaganda”
and to increase its leader’s popularity for the next
election cycle.252 If the warlords’ prestige grows, they
could establish a greater presence within the govern60

ment, which would also provide greater entrée into
Iraq by Tehran, with which several warlords have
close ties.
Even if it remains only an administrative umbrella
organization, the Hay’a is a lucrative prize because of
the cash that flows through it and the political clout
that this financial lever could represent over individual militias. Thus, not surprisingly, various players
have sought to gain control over it. The Minister of the
Interior (a leading Badr figure), for example, preferred
to absorb the militias directly into his own ministry.253
Al-Sistani allegedly had released an edict supporting
placing the militias under the Ministry of Defense, although his office maintained that there had been no
such edict and that this document was a forgery.254
In early-2015, Nuri Al-Maliki launched a concerted
behind-the-scenes lobbying and public relations effort
to garner the allegiance of some warlords in his bid to
become the head of the Hay’a, whose current director and its spokesman are from Al-Maliki’s political
grouping. Hyping his own role in the original mass
mobilization at the expense of Al-Sistani and forcefully defending the militias against domestic critics,
Al-Maliki also highlighted the key role he had played
as Prime Minister in supporting the Asad regime, no
doubt seeking to garner Iran’s backing for his candidacy.255 Al-Maliki, still a political player and an inveterate schemer despite his ouster as Prime Minister,
appeared to view the Hay’a as a vehicle for his political comeback. Although he has denied any ambition
to become Prime Minister again, he has also left the
possibility open, saying that he would do so “only if
the people demand that.”256
However, Al-Maliki’s bid for power could generate discontent among some warlords and politicians.
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One Member of Parliament, for example, argued
that the corruption that had characterized the former
Prime Minister’s time in office would now reemerge
with Al-Maliki’s return; and Al-Sadr, for his part, vehemently rejected Al-Maliki, reminding his audience
that the latter had been responsible for the Army’s
collapse and warning that none of Al-Sadr’s followers
would participate in the Hay’a under the latter, while
suggesting that Al-Sistani select a leader instead.257
Al-Sistani and Al-Ammar’s Supreme Islamic Council
have also opposed Al-Maliki, while there have been
contradictory reports on Iran’s stand. Al-Ibadi, who
no doubt views Al-Maliki as a serious challenger to
his own position, also opposed Al-Maliki’s candidacy,
reminding the latter that “I am the commander of the
Hashd . . . and no one else,” and reportedly threatened
to cut off pay to the militias if the latter sided with
Al-Maliki.258 Nevertheless political in-fighting around
the Hay’a is likely to continue and Al-Maliki may yet
strike a deal.
The Complexities of Demobilization.
Once the ISIS threat is eliminated or recedes, many
in Iraq would like to see the recently expanded militias restructured, reduced in size, or, if possible, even
closed. A Kurdish politician, for example, was adamant that the Shia militias “must not remain armed
once terrorism is eliminated.”259 Although it may be
a question to be faced some time down the road, demobilizing the armed and experienced fighters in the
militias will be a difficult undertaking for any Iraqi
government, even if it were willing to do so.
As long as domestic power relations are not stabilized and a strong central government can affirm its
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authority, militias are not likely to disappear, especially given the present structure of the government,
with the militia-linked political parties as constituent
embedded elements within the political system. Government officials linked to the warlords, as one might
expect, promote their own militias as, for example,
was the case of Deputy Prime Minister Baha’ Al-Araji,
who asserted that the victory achieved over ISIS in Jurf
Al-Sakhr would not have been possible without the
Saraya Al-Salam, his party’s militia.260 The government
sought to appropriate money in the 2015 draft budget
for the creation of 15,000 new jobs for militia fighters
in the government sector, with another 20,000 personnel to be integrated into the Army as an inducement
for an eventual demobilization.261 However, given the
sharp fall in the country’s oil revenues, the proposal
ran into legislative opposition, with some suggesting instead a parallel cheaper “reserve army.” Cutting funds for the militias may be difficult, not least
because of the presence of their mother parties in the
Parliament. For example, Al-Wafa’ li’l-Muqawama
(the party of the Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’) warned
that any cuts would be a “red line” and pushed for
even more money for 2015.262 One Member of Parliament even proposed shifting money from the Department of Defense to the militias, arguing that the latter
deserved to be rewarded.263 As of January 2015, the
budget proposal for 2015 year was to allot 1 trillion
Dinars ($780 million) for the militias.264
The United States, no doubt concerned about
many of the negative dynamics that have emerged,
has reportedly sought to curb the militias. Some local
news reports, in fact, claimed that the United States
at one point asked Prime Minister Al-Ibadi to replace
untrained and ideologically partisan militia forces in
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the Baghdad area—then representing roughly half the
city’s force structure—with regular forces.265 However, while on a visit to the United States in October
2014, Prime Minster Al-Ibadi noted that he had “made
clear” to President Barack Obama what the militias’
role was and the need to support the latter, as they
were “the backbone of the fight against ISIS.”266 That
position had not changed in 2015, as Al-Ibadi reportedly had refused outright a visiting U.S. Senator’s
request that the militias be disbanded.267
Significantly, rivalry among the warlords could
increase sharply and lead to further violence once the
ISIS threat recedes, particularly if there is a weak government or if the warlords are embedded in the government and seek greater control of the latter. In the
past, some militias have clashed openly, as was the
case between Al-Sadr’s followers and the Ahl Al-Haqq,
itself an offshoot from Al-Sadr’s Jaysh Al-Mahdi parent
organization, with the two militias competing for the
same personnel. To be sure, an imminent ISIS threat
induced greater cooperation among the Shia militias.
For example, even Al-Sadr and Ahl Al-Haqq’s commander, Al-Khazali, announced they would be cooperating, despite their past enmity, which had included
armed clashes on Sadr’s home ground of Sadr City as
late as 2013.268
Nevertheless, competition remains just below
the surface, and small-scale incidents suggest ongoing tensions. For example, one unit sponsored by the
Ataba in Najaf complained that, while it was operating in Samarra, the Badr unit there ordered that it
subordinate itself to the latter, otherwise, it would get
no pay and be forced to leave.269 In January 2015, an
armed clash broke out in Baghdad between two small
militias, probably over control of turf.270 Competition

64

for lucrative assets could also pit rival warlords, as
was the case between Badr and the Supreme Islamic
Council for control of the Baghdad airport.271 Typically, Al-Sadr’s party accused the Minister of the Interior
(a leading figure in Badr) of favoring his own party
when he removed the chief of police in Basra and replaced the latter with a Badr member.272 Competition
could become even more violent and destabilizing
than in the past, especially since the militias’ acquisition of combat experience, additional recruits, and
new weaponry as part of the ISIS War.
Convincing militia forces to relinquish control
in areas where they have operated may be difficult,
and Qays Al-Khazali, leader of the Ahl Al-Haqq, flatly
stated that his men would not leave the areas they
liberated.273 The militias even seized some contested
territory in Al-Anbar and annexed it to Karbala and
Babil provinces, reversing the earlier reallocations of
territory when Saddam had shifted provincial boundaries.274 Similarly, disarming the militias of personal
weapons as part of demobilization would be unrealistic, given the country’s gun culture and continuing
insecurity and, particularly as even heavy weapons
now seem to have seeped down to the tribes.275
IMPLICATIONS FOR LANDPOWER
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While one cannot predict what Iraq will look like
in the future, over the coming months, Iraqi forces in
all their forms, and supported by the Coalition, will
likely retake some of the territory lost to ISIS earlier
and push back, if not eliminate, the ISIS threat. What
is significant in terms of the warlords and their militias is that the ongoing ISIS War is affording them
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an unprecedented level of legitimacy within the Shia
community. The warlords can now point not only to
Al-Sistani’s original fatwa as a basic source of legitimacy, but also can rely on the widespread gratitude
for their achievements from all sectors of Shia society
and on the country’s continuing need for their services. In fact, Baghdad and Maysan province are already
in the process of building memorials to fallen militia
fighters. While the militias’ names or administrative
and organizational structures may change, the militia
phenomenon is not likely to disappear in the near future, and the warlords will remain players in both the
security sphere and in politics. Moreover, as America’s de facto co-belligerents, the warlords and the militias have become a factor that can have a significant
impact on U.S. interests and, therefore, represent a
dimension that the United States must take into consideration both at the political and operational levels.
Based on the preceding analysis, a number of recommendations for U.S. policy and Landpower interests emerge in relation to Iraq’s Shia warlords and
their militias, with implications for decisonmakers
and operators. Policymakers, planners, and operators
must understand that the militias are not simply military forces, but that the warlords who lead the militias
are also political and often religious leaders and that
their power extends into Parliament as well as into the
local administration. Prime Minister Al-Ibadi oversees
a coalition government in which warlords and the
parties and militias they control constitute a significant element, and the Prime Minister operates with
limited maneuver space and may not always be able
to achieve certain political goals or implement certain
policies. If the warlords believe the United States is
favoring other sectarian or ethnic communities at the
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expense of the Shia, this could be reflected in militia
hostility toward U.S. personnel.
As the U.S. Landpower footprint increases, planners and commanders must remain sensitive to the
integrated position the warlords and the militias have
in Iraq’s security system, and understand that the militias are embedded in military operations with the
Army and police. As such, their presence and influence must be considered in U.S. decisionmaking, and
the appropriate conditions and limits on operational
cooperation, intelligence sharing, and logistic support
to the Iraqi forces must be determined. U.S. personnel must be vigilant to maintain operational security,
a situation that will be complicated by the embedded
nature of the militias within the Iraqi security forces,
including in operations rooms, as leaks of future plans
by militia sources have been common.276 Operators
must be aware that, within the Iraqi military and police, there are likely to be militia veterans, as well as
members or sympathizers of the political or religious
organizations that sponsor the militias, or relatives, or
fellow-tribesmen of fighters in the militias.
Policymakers and operators must keep in mind the
militias’ links with Iran and remember that Iranian hostility to U.S. policies or a degradation in U.S.-Iranian
relations could increase the risk to deployed personnel, whether on a combat mission or in support, which
could be exacerbated by a history of long-standing militia hostility toward U.S. forces from earlier clashes.
In light of the militias’ Iranian connection and likely
recruitment of key Iraqi militia individuals over the
years, the militias are likely to collect intelligence on
behalf of the Iranians—as well as for their own benefit—on U.S. operations, communications, combat
systems, and intelligence methods and sources.
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Operators must ensure that effective deconfliction
with the militias is treated as a priority, even if only
indirectly. The possibility of friendly fire involving
the militias could have serious repercussions both
in the field and in the political arena. In particular, if
the number of U.S. forward air controllers remains
limited, reliance on local sources—including militias
or their supporters or enemies—for airpower targeting may not always be reliable, and care must be exercised in ensuring congruence with U.S. objectives.
Insofar as possible, personnel should be prepared to
deal with incidents and confrontations with militia
personnel that could otherwise escalate quickly, given
the background hostility, or be inflated and distorted
for propaganda purposes. In addition, U.S. operators
must be aware that elements favorable or hostile to
the militias could seek to use information to influence U.S. targeting decisions, with potentially serious
consequences.
Planners should develop easy-to-use recognition
guides to distinguish the prodigious array of militia
logos, flags, and uniforms (which, in some cases, may
resemble those worn by the Iraqi Army or police), and
include images of the militias’ leadership. This will facilitate evaluating likely policies affecting U.S. operations and guard against potential threats.
Landpower operators may have to plan for additional force protection measures for Coalition partners and contractors—including armed ones who
often operate with little outside control—whose numbers are likely to increase and who may be in contact
with militia elements. Even though this is not strictly
a U.S. Government responsibility, nevertheless, the
reality on the ground could present a policy and
operational dilemma.
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Policymakers and operators must promote any
rehabilitation of former Baathists—whether in the political realm or on the ground—carefully, understanding the sensitivity this issue represents for the militias
and for the Shia community at large, as they or their
families may have been victims of some of the same
individuals seeking reintegration.
The U.S. Government and Department of Defense
should monitor the militias’ media, and operators
should develop a robust information capability to
counter that media’s negative anti-Coalition message
which, if not neutralized, could shape public opinion and could affect operations and force protection
for personnel on the ground. Personnel must keep in
mind that most militias have well-developed media
and religious networks that can spread libelous accusations quickly. The often factionalized local government cannot always provide such message security.
Military personnel must be prepared to deal with the
moral dilemmas they may well face if they witness the
mistreatment of civilians or prisoners by the militias.
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